ICANN New gTLD Application

1 CUSTOMARY REGISTRY SERVICES

Verisign provides a comprehensive system and physical security solution that is designed to
ensure a TLD is protected from unauthorized disclosure, alteration, insertion, or destruction of
registry data. Our system addresses all areas of security including information and policies,
security procedures, the systems development lifecycle, physical security, system hacks, break-
ins, data tampering, and other disruptions to operations. Our operational environments not only
meet the security criteria specified in our customer contractual agreements, thereby preventing
unauthorized access to or disclosure of information or resources on the Internet by systems
operating in accordance with applicable standards, but also are subject to multiple independent
assessments as detailed in the response to Question 30, Security Policy. Our physical and
system security methodology follows a mature, ongoing lifecycle that was developed and
implemented many years before the development of the industry standards with which we
currently comply. Please see the response to Question 30, Security Policy, for details of the
security features of our registry services.

Our registry services fully comply with relevant standards and best current practice RFCs
published by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), including all successor standards,
modifications, or additions relating to the DNS and name server operations including without
limitation RFCs 1034, 1035, 1982, 2181, 2182, 2671, 3226, 3596, 3597, 3901, 4343, and 4472.
Moreover, our Shared Registration System (SRS) supports the following IETF Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP) specifications, where the Extensible Markup Language (XML)
templates and XML schemas are defined in RFC 3915, 5730, 5731, 5732, 5733, and 5734. By
strictly adhering to these RFCs, we help ensure our registry services do not create a condition
that adversely affects the throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of responses to
Internet servers or end systems. Besides our leadership in authoring RFCs for EPP, Domain
Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC), and other DNS services, we have created and
contributed to several now well-established IETF standards and are a regular and long-standing
participant in key Internet standards forums.

Figure 23-1 (see Attachment VRSN_.verisign_Q23_Figures for all figures in this question
response) summarizes the technical and business components of those registry services,
customarily offered by a registry operator (i.e., Verisign), that support this application. These
services are currently operational and support both large and small Verisign-managed
registries. Customary registry services are provided in the same manner as we provide these
services for our existing gTLDs.

Through these established registry services, we have proven our ability to operate a reliable and
low-risk registry that supports millions of transactions per day. We are unaware of any potential
security or stability concern related to any of these services.
Registry services defined by this application are not intended to be offered in a manner unique
to the new generic top-level domain (gTLD) nor are any proposed services unique to this
application’s registry.

As further evidence of our compliance with ICANN mandated security and stability
requirements, Verisign allocates the applicable RFCs to each of the five customary registry
services (items A – E above). For each registry service, we also provide evidence in Figure 23-2
of our RFC compliance and include relevant ICANN prior-service approval actions.

1.1 Critical Operations of the Registry

i. Receipt of Data from Registrars Concerning Registration of Domain Names and
Name Servers

See Item A in Figure 23-1 and Figure 23-2.

ii. Provision to Registrars Status Information Relating to the Zone Servers

Verisign registry services provisions to registrars status information relating to zone servers for
the TLD. The services also allow a domain name to be updated with clientHold, serverHold
status, which removes the domain name server details from zone files. This ensures that DNS
queries of the domain name are not resolved temporarily. When these hold statuses are
removed, the name server details are written back to zone files and DNS queries are again
resolved. Figure 23-3 describes the domain name status information and zone insertion
indicator provided to registrars. The zone insertion indicator determines whether the name
server details of the domain name exist in the zone file for a given domain name status. We also
have the capability to withdraw domain names from the zone file in near-real time by changing
the domain name statuses as needed or by request from courts or legal authorities.

iii. Dissemination of TLD Zone Files

See Item B in Figure 23-1 and Figure 23-2.

iv. Operation of the Registry Zone Servers

As a company, Verisign operates zone servers and serves DNS resolution from 76
geographically distributed resolution sites located in North America, South America, Africa,
Europe, Asia, and Australia. Currently, 17 DNS locations are designated primary sites, offering
greater capacity than smaller sites comprising the remainder of our constellation. We also use
Anycast techniques and regional Internet resolution sites to expand coverage, accommodate
emergency or surge capacity, and support system availability during maintenance procedures.
We operate the .verisign gTLD from a minimum of eight of our primary sites (two on the East
Coast of the United States, two on the West Coast of the United States, two in Europe, and two
in Asia) and expand resolution sites based on traffic volume and patterns. Further details of the
geographic diversity of our zone servers are provided in the response to Question 34,
Geographic Diversity. Moreover, additional details of our zone servers are provided in the
response to Question 32, Architecture and the response to Question 35, DNS Service.

v. Dissemination of Contact and Other Information Concerning Domain Name
Server Registrations

See Item C in Figure 23-1 and Figure 23-2.

2 OTHER PRODUCTS OR SERVICES THE REGISTRY OPERATOR IS REQUIRED TO PROVIDE BECAUSE OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
CONSENSUS POLICY

Verisign is a proven supporter of ICANN’s consensus-driven, bottom-up policy development
process whereby community members identify a problem, initiate policy discussions, and
generate a solution that produces effective and sustained results. We currently provide all of the
products or services (collectively referred to as services) that the registry operator is required to
provide because of the establishment of a Consensus Policy. For the .verisign gTLD, we
implement these services using the same proven processes and procedures currently in-place
for all registries under our management. Furthermore, we execute these services on computing
platforms comparable to those of other registries under our management. Our extensive
experience with consensus policy required services and our proven processes to implement
these services greatly minimize any potential risk to Internet security or stability. Details of these
services are provided in the following subsections. It shall be noted that consensus policy
services required of registrars (e.g., Whois Reminder, Expired Domain) are not included in this
response. This exclusion is in accordance with the direction provided in the question’s Notes
column to address registry operator services.

2.1 Inter-Registrar Transfer Policy (IRTP)

Technical Component: In compliance with the IRTP consensus policy, we have designed our
registration systems to systematically restrict the transfer of domain names within 60 days of the
initial create date. In addition, we have implemented EPP and “AuthInfo” code functionality,
which is used to further authenticate transfer requests. The registration system has been
designed to enable compliance with the five-day Transfer grace period and includes the
following functionality:

* Allows the losing registrar to proactively ‘ACK’ or acknowledge a transfer prior to the
expiration of the five-day Transfer grace period
* Allows the losing registrar to proactively ‘NACK’ or not acknowledge a transfer prior to the
expiration of the five-day Transfer grace period
* Allows the system to automatically ACK the transfer request once the five-day Transfer
grace period has passed if the losing registrar has not proactively ACK’d or NACK’d the
transfer request.

Business Component: All requests to transfer a domain name to a new registrar are handled
according to the procedures detailed in the IRTP. Dispute proceedings arising from a registrarʹs
alleged failure to abide by this policy may be initiated by any ICANN-accredited registrar under
the Transfer Dispute Resolution Policy (TDRP). Verisign’s compliance office serves as the first-
level dispute resolution provider pursuant to the associated TDRP.

Verisign has developed and implemented an automated system known as the Transfer Dispute
Resolution System (TDRS) by which to track and process Requests for Enforcement that
registrars may file under the TDRP. Registrars access the TDRS by using unique login
credentials assigned to their designated transfer point of contact. Using the TDRS, registrars
may submit a Request for Enforcement case, check on the status of a case to which they are a
party, withdraw a case, respond to a case filed against them, and waive their right to appeal
once a decision has been rendered. The TDRS is designed to comply with the timelines
specified in the TDRP and allows Verisign’s compliance office to track and process cases in
accordance with the policy.

The TDRS is also integrated with other Verisign systems to facilitate the transfer dispute case
activity reporting that ICANN mandates for Verisign’s Monthly Registry Operator Reports.

Security and Stability Concerns: We are unaware of any impact, caused by the service, on
throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or
end-user systems. By implementing the IRTP in accordance with ICANN policy, security is
enhanced as all transfer commands are authenticated using the AuthInfo code prior to
processing.

ICANN Prior Approval: We have been in compliance with the IRTP since November 2004.

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .verisign TLD.

2.2 Add Grace Period (AGP) Limits Policy

Technical Component: Our registry system monitors registrars’ Add grace period deletion
activity and provides reporting that permits us to assess registration fees upon registrars that
have exceeded the AGP thresholds stipulated in the AGP Limits Policy. Further, we accept and
evaluate all exemption requests received from registrars and determine whether the exemption
request meets the exemption criteria. We maintain all AGP Limits Policy exemption request
activity so that this material may be included within our Monthly Registry Operator Report to
ICANN.

Registrars that exceed the limits established by the policy may submit exemption requests to
Verisign for consideration. Our compliance office reviews these exemption requests in
accordance with the AGP Limits Policy and renders a decision. Upon request, we submit
supplemental detailed reporting on exemption request activity to support the high-level
exemption request activity reporting that ICANN mandates for Verisign’s Monthly Registry
Operator Reports.

Business Component: The Add grace period (AGP) is restricted for any gTLD operator that
has implemented an AGP.

* At the end of each month, Verisign assesses overage charges to any registrar account for
domain names deleted during the AGP that exceed (i) 10% of that registrarʹs net new
registrations (calculated as the total number of net adds of one-year through ten-year
registrations as defined in the monthly reporting requirement of Operator Agreements) in
that month, or (ii) fifty (50) domain names, whichever is greater. If a registrar applies for an
exemption (as described in the next paragraph) and Verisign grants an exemption, the
registrar’s account will be credited for the amount of the exemption that has been granted.

* Upon the documented demonstration of extraordinary circumstances, a registrar may seek
an exemption from such restrictions in a specific month. The registrar must confirm in writing
how, at the time the names were deleted, these extraordinary circumstances were not
known, reasonably could not have been known, and were outside the registrarʹs control.
Acceptance of any exemption will be at our sole and reasonable discretion; however
ʺextraordinary circumstancesʺ that reoccur regularly for the same registrar will not be
deemed extraordinary.

In addition to all other reporting requirements to ICANN, we identify each registrar that has
sought an exemption, along with a brief description of the type of extraordinary circumstance
and the action, approval, or denial that we took. Further, Verisign makes registrar-specific
reports available to each registrar that provide the registrar with its specific Add grace period
deletion activity as it relates to the AGP Limits Policy. These reports help registrars identify and
address excessive deletion activity before they exceed policy thresholds.

Security and Stability Concerns: We are unaware of any impact, caused by the policy, on
throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or
end-user systems.

ICANN Prior Approval: We have had experience with this policy since its implementation in
April 2009.

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .verisign TLD.

2.3 Registry Services Evaluation Policy (RSEP)

Technical Component: Verisign adheres to all RSEP submission requirements. We have
followed the process many times and are fully aware of the submission procedures, the type of
documentation required, and the evaluation process that ICANN employs.

Business Component: In accordance with ICANN procedures detailed on the ICANN RSEP
website (http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄registries⁄rsep⁄), we follow this policy when submitting a
request for new registry services.

Security and Stability Concerns: As part of the RSEP submission process, we identify any
potential security and stability concerns in accordance with RSEP stability and security
requirements. We never launch services without satisfactory completion of the RSEP process
and resulting approval.

ICANN Prior Approval: Not applicable.

Unique to the TLD: gTLD RSEP procedures are not implemented in a manner unique to the
.verisign TLD.

3 PRODUCTS OR SERVICES ONLY A REGISTRY OPERATOR IS CAPABLE OF PROVIDING BY REASON OF ITS DESIGNATION AS THE REGISTRY
OPERATOR

Verisign has developed a number of services that complement traditional registration and
resolution registry services. For each proposed .verisign service, in accordance with direction
provided in Question 23, we detail the technical and business components of the service and
identify any potential threat to registry security or stability. Each service is currently operational,
supporting multiple registries under ICANN’s purview. Details of previous interactions with
ICANN to approve the operational use of the service are also provided.

We are unaware of any competition issue that may require the registry services listed in this
response to be referred to the appropriate governmental competition authority or authorities with
applicable jurisdiction. ICANN previously approved each service, at which time it was
determined that either the service raised no competitive concerns or any applicable concerns
related to competition were satisfactorily addressed.

3.1 WhoWas Service

Technical Component: From time to time Verisign may receive requests for historical domain
name registration data, including information on domain names that have been deleted. These
requests may be made for a variety of reasons, such as a request from a registrar who may
need a more complete registration history of a particular domain name, a request related to an
investigation, legal action related to trademark infringement claims, or other investigations of
potential nefarious uses.

Once a domain name deletion request has been completed, we ensure the domain name is
removed from the registry Whois service and the Whois data associated with the domain name
is no longer publicly available. This occurs at the time the deletion transaction is processed for a
domain name within the Add grace period, or for domain names that are deleted outside of the
Add grace period following the Pending Delete period.

The WhoWas service provides an automated capability for a customer (i.e., registrar or non-
registrar) to obtain the registration history for the entire life of a domain name. This history
includes the domain name, registration dates, and registrar of record for each period (i.e., until
the domain name expired, was transferred to another registrar, or was deleted). The WhoWas
service does not modify the existing Whois service nor disclose the full registration transaction
history (e.g., modifications, renewals, status changes), which could be made available through
special request to Verisign. The response data includes only the registry data listed above and
does not include registrant or other contact data.

Business Component: We offer the Domain Name WhoWas Service through a secure web-
based interface. In the future, an application programming interface (API) may be available to
support automated activity.

The .verisign gTLD offers the Domain Name WhoWas Service under a subscription-based
model to both registrars and non-registrars. To subscribe to the service, customers must
execute a service agreement that contains, among other things, a license grant and appropriate
restrictions on use of the data.

Qualified customers may subscribe to the service for a 90-day term with an auto-renewal
clause. There is a nominal fee to offset the implementation, maintenance, and operational costs
of the service.

Security and Stability Concerns: We are unaware of any impact, caused by the service, on
throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or
end-user systems.

ICANN Prior Approval: ICANN approved the same WhoWas service for Verisign’s use for
.com and .net on 16 July 2009 (Reference: Registry Services Evaluation Process (RSEP)
Proposal 2009007).

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .verisign TLD.

3.2 Registry Lock Service

Technical Component: Verisign may wish to protect certain domains against accidental or
inadvertent modifications or deletions that would affect high profile or valuable domain names.
The Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) specifies both client (registrar) and server (registry)
status codes that prevent registry changes (i.e., a delete, transfer, or update) that are not
intended by the registrant. Registrars can use client status codes, but with Verisign’s Registry
Lock Service, registrars can also take advantage of server status codes.

The following EPP server status codes are applicable for domain names: (i)
serverUpdateProhibited, (ii) serverDeleteProhibited, and (iii) serverTransferProhibited. These
statuses may be applied individually or in combination.

The EPP also enables setting host (i.e., name server) status codes to prevent deleting or
renaming a host or modifying its IP addresses. Setting host status codes at the registry reduces
the risk of inadvertent disruption of DNS resolution for domain names.

Business Component: The Registry Lock Service is used in conjunction with a registrar’s
proprietary security measures to bring a greater level of security to domain names and help
mitigate potential for unintended deletions, transfers, and⁄or updates.

Two components comprise the Registry Lock Service:
* Verisign and⁄or its registrars provides Verisign with a list of the domain names to be placed
on the server status codes. During the term of the service agreement, the registrar can add
domain names to be placed on the server status codes and⁄or remove domain names
currently placed on the server status codes. We then manually authenticate that the
registrar submitting the list of domain names is the registrar-of-record for such domain
names.

* If a registrar requires changes (including updates, deletes, and transfers) to a domain name
placed on a server status code, we follow a secure, authenticated process to perform the
change. This process includes a request from an authorized representative for Verisign to
remove the specific registry status code, validation of the authorized individual by Verisign,
removal of the specified server status code, registrar completion of the desired change, and
a request from the authorized individual to reinstate the server status code on the domain
name. This process is designed to complement automated transaction processing through
the Shared Registration System (SRS) by using independent authentication by trusted
registry experts.

There will be no additional fees charged for this service.

Security and Stability Concerns: We are unaware of any impact, caused by the service, on
throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or
end-user systems.

ICANN Prior Approval: ICANN approved the same Registry Lock Service for Verisign’s use on
.com and .net on 10 July 2009 (RSEP Proposal 2009005) and for .name on 16 February 2011
(RSEP Proposal 2011002).

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .verisign TLD.

3.3 Bulk Transfer after Partial Portfolio Acquisition (BTAPPA) Service

Technical Component: BTAPPA applies to situations where one ICANN-accredited registrar
(i.e., a gaining registrar) acquires by means of a stock or asset purchase, merger, or similar
transaction a portion, but not all, of another ICANN-accredited registrarʹs (i.e., losing registrar)
domain name portfolio in the gTLD or a gaining registrar receives a request from a registrant to
transfer a significant number of its domain names from the losing registrar to the gaining
registrar.

Unless an entire portfolio of domain names is being transferred, gaining registrars must request
that each domain name be transferred individually.

Gaining and⁄or losing registrars must meet the following requirements:

* Gaining registrar must be ICANN-accredited for the gTLD.

* Gaining registrar must be in good standing and be under a Registry-Registrar Agreement
with Verisign.

* Gaining registrar must provide us with evidence (i.e., affidavit, sale documents) that sets
forth the transfer date or, if an acquisition, the target closing date.

* If domain names are to be transferred from multiple losing registrars, then they must be
registrar affiliates. A registrar affiliate is a registrar entity that controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with, another entity.

* Transfers of domain names to multiple gaining registrars are permitted, regardless of
familiar relationship.

* Losing registrar must certify that the existing Registrar-Registrant Agreement with customers
permits the transfer of domain names in the event of acquisition by another party. A losing
registrar must ensure that no obstacles are placed in the way of the gaining registrar.

* Both gaining and losing registrar must approve the list of domain names subject to the
BTAPPA prior to the change in sponsorship by the .verisign gTLD.

* Domain names with the following registry statuses (see response to Question 27,
Registration Lifecycle for details of registry statuses) at the time of the transfer are not
subject to the BTAPPA: Pending Transfer, Redemption Grace Period (RGP), or Pending
Delete.

* Domain names within the 45-day auto-renew grace period are subject to BTAPPA, but we
may deny credit for domain names that the registrant(s) chooses to delete after the partial
BTAPPA, but prior to the expiration of the 45-day auto-renew grace window.

* In an acquisition, the losing registrar must agree to provide at least 15-day prior written
notice of the partial bulk transfer to all registrants associated with domain names involved in
the transfer. Notice must include:

a. Statement that all transfer rules and policies set by ICANN and the .verisign
gTLD shall remain in effect.

b. Instructions on how a registrant can opt-out of bulk transfer in the event that the
losing registrar has indicated that it is willing to continue to serve as the registrar
for the domain name.

* Gaining registrar must make request for BTAPPA to Verisign within one calendar year of the
closing date of the acquisition.

* Request for BTAPPA service from the .verisign gTLD is limited to one request per registrar
affiliate per six-month period unless otherwise agreed to by us.

* We have the discretion to reject requests for BTAPPA if there is reasonable evidence that
BTAPPA is being requested to avoid fees otherwise due to Verisign or ICANN.

* BTAPPA may not be requested if the gaining registrarʹs request would otherwise qualify for
bulk transfer under Part B of ICANN’s Policy on Transfer of Registrations between
Registrars.

* Once a BTAPPA has been completed, there is no grace period to reverse the transfer.
Business Component: BTAPPA is offered to all ICANN-accredited registrars for the .verisign
gTLD. In order to access the service, gaining registrars must submit a formal request to us. We
validate the registrar’s identity, verify the contents of the submission, and schedule the date for
BTAPPA.

We may request additional documentation or take additional steps we deem appropriate to
ensure that all requirements are met with respect to registrar affiliate relationships.
Once we complete all necessary verifications, we perform the BTAPPA per gaining registrar
request and notify both the losing and gaining registrar of the transfer of the domain names. We
also provide the reason for non-transfer of any domain names that were not transferred.
We charge a fee to the gaining registrar based on the total value of the domain names being
transferred.

Security and Stability Concerns: We are unaware of any impact, caused by the service, on
throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or
end-user systems.

ICANN Prior Approval: ICANN approved the same BTAPPA service for Verisign’s use for .com
and .net on 9 December 2009 (RSEP Proposal 2009008).

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .verisign TLD.

3.4 Two-Factor Authentication Service

Technical Component: The Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service is designed
to improve domain name security and assist registrars in protecting the accounts they manage.
As part of the service, dynamic one-time passwords (OTPs) augment the user names and passwords
currently used to process update, transfer, and⁄or deletion requests. These one-time passwords
enable transaction processing to be based on requests that are validated both by “what users
know” (i.e., their user name and password) and “what users have” (i.e., a two-factor
authentication credential with a one-time password).

Registrars can use the one-time password when communicating directly with our Customer
Service department as well as when using the registrar portal to make manual updates,
transfers, and⁄or deletion transactions. The Two-Factor Authentication Service is an optional
service offered to registrars that execute the Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication
Service Agreement.

Business Component: There is no charge for the Registry-Registrar Two-Factor
Authentication Service. It is enabled only for registrars that wish to take advantage of the added
security provided by the service.

Security and Stability Concerns: We are unaware of any impact, caused by the service, on
throughput, response time, consistency, or coherence of the responses to Internet servers or
end-user systems. The service is intended to enhance domain name security, resulting in
increased confidence and trust by registrants.

ICANN Prior Approval: ICANN approved the same Two-Factor Authentication Service for
Verisign’s use on .com and .net on 10 July 2009 (RSEP Proposal 2009004) and for .name on
16 February 2011 (RSEP Proposal 2011001).

Unique to the TLD: This service is not provided in a manner unique to the .verisign TLD.

1 ROBUST PLAN FOR OPERATING A RELIABLE SRS

1.1 High-Level Shared Registration System (SRS) System Description

Verisign provides and operates a robust and reliable SRS that enables multiple registrars to
provide domain name registration services in the top-level domain (TLD). Our proven reliable
SRS serves approximately 915 registrars, and as a company, we have averaged more than 140
million registration transactions per day. The SRS provides a scalable, fault-tolerant platform for
the delivery of gTLDs through the use of a central customer database, a web interface, a
standard provisioning protocol (i.e., Extensible Provisioning Protocol, EPP), and a transport
protocol (i.e., Secure Sockets Layer, SSL).

The SRS components include:

* Web Interface: Allows customers to access the authoritative database for accounts,
contacts, users, authorization groups, product catalog, product subscriptions, and customer
notification messages.

* EPP Interface: Provides an interface to the SRS that enables registrars to use EPP to
register and manage domains, hosts, and contacts.

* Authentication Provider: A Verisign-developed application, specific to the SRS, that
authenticates a user based on a login name, password, and the SSL certificate common
name and client IP address.

The SRS is designed to be scalable and fault tolerant by incorporating clustering in multiple tiers
of the platform. New nodes can be added to a cluster within a single tier to scale a specific tier,
and if one node fails within a single tier, the services will still be available. The SRS allows
registrars to manage the .verisign gTLD domain names in a single architecture.

To flexibly accommodate the scale of our transaction volumes, as well as new technologies, we
employ the following design practices:

* Scale for Growth: Scale to handle current volumes and projected growth.

* Scale for Peaks: Scale to twice base capacity to withstand “registration add attacks” from a
compromised registrar system.

* Limit Database CPU Utilization: Limit utilization to no more than 50 percent during peak
loads.

* Limit Database Memory Utilization: Each user’s login process that connects to the
database allocates a small segment of memory to perform connection overhead, sorting,
and data caching. Our standards mandate that no more than 40 percent of the total
available physical memory on the database server will be allocated for these functions.

Our SRS is built upon a three-tier architecture as illustrated in Figure 24-1 (see Attachment
VRSN_.verisign_Q24 Figures for all figures in this response) and detailed here:

* Gateway Layer: The first tier, the gateway servers, uses EPP to communicate with
registrars. These gateway servers then interact with application servers, which comprise the
second tier.

* Application Layer: The application servers contain business logic for managing and
maintaining the registry business. The business logic is particular to each TLD’s business
rules and requirements. The flexible internal design of the application servers allows
Verisign to easily leverage existing business rules to apply to the .verisign gTLD. The
application servers store Verisign’s data in the registry database, which comprises the third
and final tier. This simple, industry-standard design has been highly effective with other
customers for whom we provide backend registry services.

* Database Layer: The database is the heart of this architecture. It stores all the essential
information provisioned from registrars through the gateway servers. Separate servers query
the database, extract updated zone and Whois information, validate that information, and
distribute it around the clock to our worldwide domain name resolution sites.

Scalability and Performance

We implement our scalable SRS on a supportable infrastructure
that achieves the availability requirements in Specification 10. We employ the design patterns of
simplicity and parallelism in both our software and systems, based on our experience that these
factors contribute most significantly to scalability and reliable performance. Going counter to
feature-rich development patterns, we intentionally minimize the number of lines of code
between the end user and the data delivered. The result is a network of restorable components
that provide rapid, accurate updates. Figure 24-2 depicts EPP traffic flows and local redundancy
in our SRS provisioning architecture. As detailed in the figure, local redundancy is maintained
for each layer as well as each piece of equipment. This built-in redundancy enhances
operational performance while enabling the future system scaling necessary to meet additional
demand created by this or future registry applications.

Besides improving scalability and reliability, local SRS redundancy enables us to take down
individual system components for maintenance and upgrades, with little to no performance
impact. With our redundant design, we can perform routine maintenance while the remainder of
the system remains online and unaffected. For the .verisign gTLD registry, this flexibility
minimizes unplanned downtime and provides a more consistent end-user experience.

1.2 Representative Network Diagrams

Figure 24-3 provides a summary network diagram of Verisign’s SRS. This configuration at both
the primary and alternate-primary Verisign data centers provides a highly reliable backup
capability. Data is continuously replicated between both sites to ensure failover to the alternate-
primary site can be implemented expeditiously to support both planned and unplanned outages.

1.3 Number of Servers

We continually review our server deployments for all aspects of our registry service. We
evaluate usage based on peak performance objectives as well as current transaction volumes,
which drive the quantity of servers in our implementations. Our scaling is based on the following
factors:

* Server configuration is based on CPU, memory, disk IO, total disk, and network throughput
projections.

* Server quantity is determined through statistical modeling to fulfill overall performance
objectives as defined by both the service availability and the server configuration.

* To ensure continuity of operations for the .verisign gTLD, we use a minimum of 100
dedicated servers per SRS site. These servers are virtualized to meet demand.

1.4 Description of Interconnectivity with Other Registry Systems

Figure 24-4 provides a technical overview of Verisign’s SRS, showing how the SRS component
fits into this larger system and interconnects with other system components.

1.5 Frequency of Synchronization Between Servers

We use synchronous replication to keep our SRS continuously in sync between the two data
centers. This synchronization is performed in near-real time, thereby supporting rapid failover
should a failure occur or a planned maintenance outage be required.

1.6 Synchronization Scheme

Verisign uses synchronous replication to keep the SRS continuously in sync between the two
data centers. Because the alternate-primary site is continuously up, and built using an identical
design to the primary data center, it is classified as a “hot standby.”

2 SCALABILITY AND PERFORMANCE ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed and use proprietary system
scaling models to guide the growth of our TLD supporting infrastructure. These models direct
our infrastructure scaling to include, but not be limited to, server capacity, data storage volume,
and network throughput that are aligned to projected demand and usage patterns. We
periodically update these models to account for the adoption of more capable and cost-effective
technologies.

Verisign’s scaling models are proven predictors of needed capacity and related cost. As such,
they provide the means to link the projected infrastructure needs of the .verisign gTLD with
necessary implementation and sustainment cost. Using the projected usage volume for the
most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as
an input to our scaling models, we derived the necessary infrastructure required to implement
and sustain this gTLD. Cost related to this infrastructure is provided as “Total Critical Registry
Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections
response.

3 TECHNICAL PLAN THAT IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed a set of proprietary resourcing
models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. We
routinely adjust these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These
models enable us to continually right-size our staff to accommodate projected demand and
meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the
projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 –
Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to our staffing models, we derived the necessary
personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance.
This personnel-related cost is included in “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows”
(Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

Verisign employs more than 1,040 individuals of which more than 775 comprise our technical
work force. (Current statistics are publicly available in our quarterly filings.) Drawing from this
pool of on-hand and fully committed technical resources, we have maintained DNS
operational accuracy and stability 100 percent of the time for more than 13 years for .com,
proving our ability to align personnel resource growth to the scale increases of our TLD service
offerings.

We project we will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the
response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support SRS
performance:

* Application Engineers: 19
* Database Administrators: 8
* Database Engineers: 3
* Network Administrators: 11
* Network Architects: 4
* Project Managers: 25
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11
* SRS System Administrators: 13
* Storage Administrators: 4
* Systems Architects: 9

To implement and manage the .verisign gTLD as described in this application, we scale, as
needed, the size of each technical area now supporting our portfolio of TLDs. Consistent with
our resource modeling, we periodically review the level of work to be performed and adjust staff
levels for each technical area.

When usage projections indicate a need for additional staff, our internal staffing group uses an
in-place staffing process to identify qualified candidates. These candidates are then interviewed
by the lead of the relevant technical area. By scaling one common team across all our TLDs
instead of creating a new entity to manage only this proposed gTLD, we realize significant
economies of scale and ensure our TLD best practices are followed consistently. This
consistent application of best practices helps ensure the security and stability of both the
Internet and this proposed gTLD, as we hold all contributing staff members accountable to the
same procedures that guide our execution of the Internet’s largest TLDs (i.e., .com and .net).
Moreover, by augmenting existing teams, we afford new employees the opportunity to be
mentored by existing senior staff. This mentoring minimizes start-up learning curves and helps
ensure that new staff members properly execute their duties.

4 EVIDENCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFICATION 6 AND 10 TO THE REGISTRY AGREEMENT

Section 1.2 (EPP) of Specification 6, Registry Interoperability and Continuity
Specifications. Verisign provides these services using our SRS, which complies fully with
Specification 6, Section 1.2 of the Registry Agreement. In using our SRS to provide backend
registry services, we implement and comply with relevant existing RFCs (i.e., 5730, 5731, 5732,
5733, 5734, and 5910) and intend to comply with RFCs that may be published in the future by
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), including successor standards, modifications, or
additions thereto relating to the provisioning and management of domain names that use EPP.

In addition, our SRS includes a Registry Grace Period (RGP) and thus complies with RFC 3915
and its successors. Details of the Verisign SRS’ compliance with RFC SRS⁄EPP are provided in
the response to Question 25, Extensible Provisioning Protocol. We do not use functionality
outside the base EPP RFCs, although proprietary EPP extensions are documented in Internet-
Draft format following the guidelines described in RFC 3735 within the response to Question 25.
Moreover, prior to deployment, Verisign will provide to ICANN updated documentation of all the
EPP objects and extensions supported in accordance with Specification 6, Section 1.2.

Specification 10, EPP Registry Performance Specifications. Verisign’s SRS meets all EPP Registry
Performance Specifications detailed in Specification 10, Section 2. Evidence of this
performance can be verified by a review of the .com and .net Registry Operator’s Monthly
Reports, which we file with ICANN. These reports detail our operational status of the .com and
.net registries, which use an SRS design and approach comparable to the one proposed for the
.verisign gTLD. These reports provide evidence of our ability to meet registry operation service
level agreements (SLAs) comparable to those detailed in Specification 10. The reports are
accessible at the following URL: http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄monthly-reports⁄.

In accordance with EPP Registry Performance Specifications detailed in Specification 10, our
SRS meets the following performance attributes:

* EPP service availability: Less than or equal to 864 minutes of downtime (approximately 98%)

* EPP session-command round trip time (RTT): Less than or equal to 4000 milliseconds (ms), for at least 90
percent of the commands

* EPP query-command RTT: Less than or equal to 2000 ms, for at least 90 percent of the commands

* EPP transform-command RTT: Less than or equal to 4000 ms, for at least 90 percent of the commands

1	COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THIS ASPECT OF REGISTRY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

Verisign has used Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) since its inception and possesses 
complete knowledge and understanding of EPP registry systems. Our first EPP 
implementation—for a thick registry for the .name generic top-level domain (gTLD)—was in 
2002. Since then we have continued our RFC-compliant use of EPP in multiple TLDs, as 
detailed in Figure 25-1 (see Attachment VRSN_.verisign_Q25_Figures for all figures in this 
response). 

Our understanding of EPP and our ability to implement code that complies with the applicable 
RFCs is unparalleled. Mr. Scott Hollenbeck, Verisign’s director of software development, 
authored the Extensible Provisioning Protocol and continues to be fully engaged in its 
refinement and enhancement (U.S. Patent Number 7299299 – Shared registration system for 
registering domain names). We have also developed numerous new object mappings and 
object extensions following the guidelines in RFC 3735 (Guidelines for Extending the Extensible 
Provisioning Protocol). Mr. James Gould, a principal engineer at Verisign, led and co-authored 
the most recent EPP Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) RFC effort (RFC 
5910).

All Verisign registry systems use EPP. Upon approval of this application, we will use EPP to 
provide registry services for this gTLD. The .com, .net, and .name registries, for which we are 
the registry operator, use an SRS design and approach comparable to the one proposed for this 
gTLD. Approximately 915 registrars use our EPP service, and the registry system performs 
more than 140 million EPP transactions daily without performance issues or restrictive 
maintenance windows. The processing time service level agreement (SLA) requirements for the 
Verisign-operated .net gTLD are the strictest of the current Verisign-managed gTLDs. All 
processing times for Verisign-operated gTLDs can be found in ICANN’s Registry Operator’s 
Monthly Reports at http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄monthly-reports⁄. 

We have also been active on the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) Provisioning Registry 
Protocol (provreg) working group and mailing list since work started on the EPP protocol in 
2000. This working group provided a forum for members of the Internet community to comment 
on Mr. Scott Hollenbeck’s initial EPP drafts, which Mr. Hollenbeck refined based on input and 
discussions with representatives from registries, registrars, and other interested parties. The 
working group has since concluded, but the mailing list is still active to enable discussion of 
different aspects of EPP.

1.1	EPP Interface with Registrars

Verisign fully supports the features defined in the EPP specifications and provides a set of 
software development kits (SDK) and tools to help registrars build secure and stable interfaces. 
Our SDKs give registrars the option of either fully writing their own EPP client software to 
integrate with the Shared Registration System (SRS), or using the Verisign-provided SDKs to 
aid them in the integration effort. Registrars can download the Verisign EPP SDKs and tools 
from the registrar website (http:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄domain-name-services⁄current-
registrars⁄epp-sdk⁄index.html). 

The EPP SDKs provide a host of features including connection pooling, Secure Sockets Layer 
(SSL), and a test server (stub server) to run EPP tests against. One tool—the EPP tool—
provides a web interface for creating EPP Extensible Markup Language (XML) commands and 
sending them to a configurable set of target servers. This helps registrars in creating the 
template XML and testing a variety of test cases against the EPP servers. An Operational Test 
and Evaluation (OT&E) environment, which runs the same software as the production system 
so approved registrars can integrate and test their software before moving into a live production 
environment, is also available. 

2	TECHNICAL PLAN SCOPE⁄SCALE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed and use proprietary system 
scaling models to guide the growth of our TLD supporting infrastructure. These models direct 
our infrastructure scaling to include, but not be limited to, server capacity, data storage volume, 
and network throughput that are aligned to projected demand and usage patterns. We 
periodically update these models to account for the adoption of more capable and cost-effective 
technologies. 

Our scaling models are proven predictors of needed capacity and related cost. As such, they 
provide the means to link the projected infrastructure needs of the .verisign gTLD with 
necessary implementation and sustainment cost. Using the projected usage volume for the 
most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as 
an input to our scaling models, we derived the necessary infrastructure required to implement 
and sustain this gTLD. Cost related to this infrastructure is provided as “Total Critical Registry 
Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections 
response.

3	TECHNICAL PLAN THAT IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed a set of proprietary resourcing 
models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. We 
routinely adjust these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These 
models enable us to continually right-size our staff to accommodate projected demand and 
meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the 
projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – 
Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to our staffing models, we derived the necessary 
personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance. 
Cost related to this infrastructure is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows” 
(Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response. 

We employ more than 1,040 individuals of which more than 775 comprise our technical work 
force. (Current statistics are publicly available in our quarterly filings.) Drawing from this pool of 
on-hand and fully committed technical resources, we have maintained DNS operational 
accuracy and stability 100 percent of the time for more than 13 years for .com, proving our 
ability to align personnel resource growth to the scale increases of our TLD service offerings. 

We project we will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the 
response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support the provisioning 
of EPP services:

*	Application Engineers: 19 
*	Database Engineers: 3 
*	Quality Assurance Engineers: 11 

To implement and manage the .verisign gTLD as described in this application, we scale, as 
needed, the size of each technical area now supporting our portfolio of TLDs. Consistent with 
our resource modeling, we periodically review the level of work to be performed and adjust staff 
levels for each technical area. 

When usage projections indicate a need for additional staff, our internal staffing group uses an 
in-place staffing process to identify qualified candidates. These candidates are then interviewed 
by the lead of the relevant technical area. By scaling one common team across all our TLDs 
instead of creating a new entity to manage only this proposed gTLD, we realize significant 
economies of scale and ensure our TLD best practices are followed consistently. This 
consistent application of best practices helps ensure the security and stability of both the 
Internet and this proposed TLD, as we hold all contributing staff members accountable to the 
same procedures that guide our execution of the Internet’s largest TLDs (i.e., .com and .net). 
Moreover, by augmenting existing teams, we afford new employees the opportunity to be 
mentored by existing senior staff. This mentoring minimizes start-up learning curves and helps 
ensure that new staff members properly execute their duties.

4	ABILITY TO COMPLY WITH RELEVANT RFCS 

We incorporate design reviews, code reviews, and peer reviews into our software development 
lifecycle (SDLC) to ensure compliance with the relevant RFCs. Our dedicated QA team creates 
extensive test plans and issues internal certifications when it has confirmed the accuracy of the 
code in relation to the RFC requirements. Our QA organization is independent from the 
development team within engineering. This separation helps Verisign ensure adopted 
processes and procedures are followed, further ensuring that all software releases fully consider 
the security and stability of the TLD. 

For the .verisign gTLD, the Shared Registration System (SRS) complies with the following IETF 
EPP specifications, where the XML templates and XML schemas are defined in the following 
specifications:

*	EPP RGP 3915 (http:⁄⁄www.apps.ietf.org⁄rfc⁄rfc3915.html): EPP Redemption Grace Period 
(RGP) Mapping specification for support of RGP statuses and support of Restore Request 
and Restore Report (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

*	EPP 5730 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5730): Base EPP specification (authored by Verisign’s 
Scott Hollenbeck)

*	EPP Domain 5731 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5731): EPP Domain Name Mapping 
specification (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

*	EPP Host 5732 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5732): EPP Host Mapping specification (authored 
by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

*	EPP Contact 5733 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5733): EPP Contact Mapping specification 
(authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

*	EPP TCP 5734 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5734): EPP Transport over Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP) specification (authored by Verisign’s Scott Hollenbeck)

*	EPP DNSSEC 5910 (http:⁄⁄tools.ietf.org⁄html⁄rfc5910): EPP Domain Name System Security 
Extensions (DNSSEC) Mapping specification (authored by Verisign’s James Gould and Scott 
Hollenbeck)

5	PROPRIETARY EPP EXTENSIONS

We use our SRS to provide registry services. The SRS supports the following EPP 
specifications, which we developed following the guidelines in RFC 3735, where the XML 
templates and XML schemas are defined in the specifications: 

*	IDN Language Tag (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄idn-language-tag.pdf): EPP 
internationalized domain names (IDN) language tag extension used for IDN domain name 
registrations

*	RGP Poll Mapping (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄whois-info-extension.pdf): EPP 
mapping for an EPP poll message in support of Restore Request and Restore Report

*	Whois Info Extension (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄whois-info-extension.pdf): EPP 
extension for returning additional information needed for transfers

*	EPP ConsoliDate Mapping (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄consolidate-mapping.txt): EPP 
mapping to support a Domain Sync operation for synchronizing domain name expiration 
dates

*	NameStore Extension (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄namestore-extension.pdf): EPP 
extension for routing with an EPP intelligent gateway to a pluggable set of backend products 
and services

*	Low Balance Mapping (http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄low-balance-mapping.pdf): EPP 
mapping to support low balance poll messages that proactively notify registrars of a low 
balance (available credit) condition

As part of the 2006 implementation report to bring the EPP RFC documents from Proposed 
Standard status to Draft Standard status, an implementation test matrix was completed. Two 
independently developed EPP client implementations based on the RFCs were tested against 
the Verisign EPP server for the domain, host, and contact transactions. No compliance-related 
issues were identified during this test, providing evidence that these extensions comply with 
RFC 3735 guidelines and further demonstrating Verisign’s ability to design, test, and deploy an 
RFC-compliant EPP implementation.

5.1	EPP Templates and Schemas

The EPP XML schemas are formal descriptions of the EPP XML templates. They are used to 
express the set of rules to which the EPP templates must conform in order to be considered 
valid by the schema. The EPP schemas define the building blocks of the EPP templates, 
describing the format of the data and the different EPP commands’ request and response 
formats. The current EPP implementations managed by Verisign use these EPP templates and 
schemas, as will the proposed TLD. For each proprietary XML template⁄schema, we provide a 
reference to the applicable template and include the schema. These schemas are also attached.


XML templates⁄schema for idnLang-1.0

*	Template: The templates for idnLang-1.0 can be found in Chapter 3, EPP Command 
Mapping of the relevant EPP documentation, http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄idn-language-
tag.pdf. 

*	Schema: This schema describes the extension mapping for the IDN language tag. The 
mapping extends the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features required for 
the provisioning of IDN domain name registrations.


〈?xml version=ʺ1.0ʺ encoding=ʺUTF-8ʺ?〉

〈schema targetNamespace=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄idnLang-1.0ʺ
  xmlns:idnLang=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄idnLang-1.0ʺ
  xmlns=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.w3.org⁄2001⁄XMLSchemaʺ
  elementFormDefault=ʺqualifiedʺ〉

〈annotation〉
  〈documentation〉
    Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 domain name
    extension schema for IDN Lang Tag.
  〈⁄documentation〉
〈⁄annotation〉

〈!--
Child elements found in EPP commands.
--〉
  〈element name=ʺtagʺ type=ʺlanguageʺ⁄〉

  〈!--
  End of schema.
  --〉
〈⁄schema〉

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

XML templates⁄schema for rgp-poll-1.0

*	Template: The templates for rgp-poll-1.0 can be found in Chapter 3, EPP Command Mapping 
of the relevant EPP documentation, http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄rgp-poll-mapping.pdf.

*	Schema: This schema describes the extension mapping for poll notifications. The mapping 
extends the EPP base mapping to provide additional features for registry grace period (RGP) 
poll notifications.

〈?xml version=ʺ1.0ʺ encoding=ʺUTF-8ʺ?〉

〈schema targetNamespace=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄rgp-poll-1.0ʺ
  xmlns:rgp-poll=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄rgp-poll-1.0ʺ
  xmlns:eppcom=ʺurn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0ʺ
  xmlns:rgp=ʺurn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rgp-1.0ʺ
  xmlns=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.w3.org⁄2001⁄XMLSchemaʺ
  elementFormDefault=ʺqualifiedʺ〉

〈!--
Import common element types.
--〉
〈import namespace=ʺurn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0ʺ
  schemaLocation=ʺeppcom-1.0.xsdʺ⁄〉
〈import namespace=ʺurn:ietf:params:xml:ns:rgp-1.0ʺ
  schemaLocation=ʺrgp-1.0.xsdʺ⁄〉

〈annotation〉
  〈documentation〉
    Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0
    Verisign poll notification specification for registry grace period
    poll notifications.
  〈⁄documentation〉
〈⁄annotation〉

〈!--
Child elements found in EPP commands.
--〉
〈element name=ʺpollDataʺ type=ʺrgp-poll:pollDataTypeʺ⁄〉

〈!--
Child elements of the 〈notifyData〉 element for the
redemption grace period.
--〉
〈complexType name=ʺpollDataTypeʺ〉
  〈sequence〉
    〈element name=ʺnameʺ type=ʺeppcom:labelTypeʺ⁄〉
    〈element name=ʺrgpStatusʺ type=ʺrgp:statusTypeʺ⁄〉
    〈element name=ʺreqDateʺ type=ʺdateTimeʺ⁄〉
    〈element name=ʺreportDueDateʺ type=ʺdateTimeʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄sequence〉
〈⁄complexType〉
〈
!--
End of schema.
--〉
〈⁄schema〉

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


XML templates⁄schema for whoisInf-1.0

*	Template: The templates for whoisInf-1.0 can be found in Chapter 3, EPP Command 
Mapping of the relevant EPP documentation, http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄whois-info-
extension.pdf.

*	Schema: This schema describes the extension mapping for the Whois Info extension. The 
mapping extends the EPP domain name mapping to provide additional features for returning 
additional information needed for transfers.

〈?xml version=ʺ1.0ʺ encoding=ʺUTF-8ʺ?〉

〈schema targetNamespace=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄whoisInf-1.0ʺ
  xmlns:whoisInf=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄whoisInf-1.0ʺ
  xmlns:eppcom=ʺurn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0ʺ
  xmlns=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.w3.org⁄2001⁄XMLSchemaʺ
  elementFormDefault=ʺqualifiedʺ〉

〈import namespace=ʺurn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0ʺ
  schemaLocation=ʺeppcom-1.0.xsdʺ⁄〉

〈annotation〉
  〈documentation〉
    Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0
    extension schema for Whois Info
  〈⁄documentation〉
〈⁄annotation〉

〈!--
Possible Whois Info extension root elements.
--〉
〈element name=ʺwhoisInfʺ type=ʺwhoisInf:whoisInfTypeʺ⁄〉
〈element name=ʺwhoisInfDataʺ type=ʺwhoisInf:whoisInfDataTypeʺ⁄〉

〈!--
Child elements for the 〈whoisInf〉 extension which
is used as an extension to an info command.
--〉
〈complexType name=ʺwhoisInfTypeʺ〉
  〈sequence〉
    〈element name=ʺflagʺ type=ʺbooleanʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄sequence〉
〈⁄complexType〉

〈!--
Child elements for the 〈whoisInfData〉 extension which
is used as an extension to the info response.
--〉
〈complexType name=ʺwhoisInfDataTypeʺ〉
  〈sequence〉
  〈element name=ʺregistrarʺ type=ʺstringʺ⁄〉
  〈element name=ʺwhoisServerʺ type=ʺeppcom:labelTypeʺ
    minOccurs=ʺ0ʺ⁄〉
  〈element name=ʺurlʺ type=ʺtokenʺ minOccurs=ʺ0ʺ⁄〉
  〈element name=ʺirisServerʺ type=ʺeppcom:labelTypeʺ
    minOccurs=ʺ0ʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄sequence〉
  〈⁄complexType〉

〈⁄schema〉

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


XML templates⁄schema for sync-1.0 (consoliDate)

*	Template: The templates for sync-1.0 can be found in Chapter 3, EPP Command Mapping of 
the relevant EPP documentation, http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄consolidate-mapping.txt.

*	Schema: This schema describes the extension mapping for the synchronization of domain 
name registration period expiration dates. This service is known as ʺConsoliDate.ʺ The 
mapping extends the EPP domain name mapping to provide features that allow a protocol 
client to end a domain name registration period on a specific month and day.


 〈?xml version=ʺ1.0ʺ encoding=ʺUTF-8ʺ?〉

   〈schema targetNamespace=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄sync-1.0ʺ
           xmlns:sync=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄sync-1.0ʺ
           xmlns=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.w3.org⁄2001⁄XMLSchemaʺ
           elementFormDefault=ʺqualifiedʺ〉

     〈annotation〉
       〈documentation〉
         Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 domain name
         extension schema for expiration date synchronization.
       〈⁄documentation〉
     〈⁄annotation〉

   〈!--
   Child elements found in EPP commands.
   --〉
     〈element name=ʺupdateʺ type=ʺsync:updateTypeʺ⁄〉

   〈!--
   Child elements of the 〈update〉 command.
   --〉
     〈complexType name=ʺupdateTypeʺ〉
       〈sequence〉
         〈element name=ʺexpMonthDayʺ type=ʺgMonthDayʺ⁄〉
       〈⁄sequence〉
     〈⁄complexType〉

   〈!--
   End of schema.
   --〉
   〈⁄schema〉

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


XML templates⁄schema for namestoreExt-1.1

*	Template: The templates for namestoreExt-1.1 can be found in Chapter 3, EPP Command 
Mapping of the relevant EPP documentation, http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄namestore-
extension.pdf.

*	Schema: This schema describes the extension mapping for the routing with an EPP 
intelligent gateway to a pluggable set of backend products and services. The mapping 
extends the EPP domain name and host mapping to provide a sub-product identifier to 
identify the target sub-product that the EPP operation is intended for.

〈?xml version=ʺ1.0ʺ encoding=ʺUTF-8ʺ?〉

〈schema targetNamespace=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign-grs.com⁄epp⁄namestoreExt-1.1ʺ
  xmlns=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.w3.org⁄2001⁄XMLSchemaʺ
  xmlns:namestoreExt=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign-grs.com⁄epp⁄namestoreExt-1.1ʺ
  elementFormDefault=ʺqualifiedʺ〉

〈annotation〉
  〈documentation〉
    Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0 Namestore extension schema
    for destination registry routing.
  〈⁄documentation〉
〈⁄annotation〉

〈!-- General Data types. --〉
〈simpleType name=ʺsubProductTypeʺ〉
  〈restriction base=ʺtokenʺ〉
    〈minLength value=ʺ1ʺ⁄〉
    〈maxLength value=ʺ64ʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄restriction〉
〈⁄simpleType〉

〈complexType name=ʺextAnyTypeʺ〉
  〈sequence〉
    〈any namespace=ʺ##otherʺ maxOccurs=ʺunboundedʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄sequence〉
〈⁄complexType〉

〈!-- Child elements found in EPP commands and responses. --〉
〈element name=ʺnamestoreExtʺ type=ʺnamestoreExt:namestoreExtTypeʺ⁄〉

〈!-- Child elements of the 〈product〉 command. --〉
〈complexType name=ʺnamestoreExtTypeʺ〉
  〈sequence〉
    〈element name=ʺsubProductʺ
      type=ʺnamestoreExt:subProductTypeʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄sequence〉
〈⁄complexType〉

〈!-- Child response elements. --〉
〈element name=ʺnsExtErrDataʺ type=ʺnamestoreExt:nsExtErrDataTypeʺ⁄〉

〈!-- 〈prdErrData〉 error response elements. --〉
〈complexType name=ʺnsExtErrDataTypeʺ〉
  〈sequence〉
    〈element name=ʺmsgʺ type=ʺnamestoreExt:msgTypeʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄sequence〉
  〈⁄complexType〉

〈!-- 〈prdErrData〉 〈msg〉 element. --〉
〈complexType name=ʺmsgTypeʺ〉
  〈simpleContent〉
    〈extension base=ʺnormalizedStringʺ〉
      〈attribute name=ʺcodeʺ
        type=ʺnamestoreExt:prdErrCodeTypeʺ use=ʺrequiredʺ⁄〉
      〈attribute name=ʺlangʺ type=ʺlanguageʺ default=ʺenʺ⁄〉
    〈⁄extension〉
  〈⁄simpleContent〉
〈⁄complexType〉

〈!-- 〈prdErrData〉 error response codes. --〉
〈simpleType name=ʺprdErrCodeTypeʺ〉
  〈restriction base=ʺunsignedShortʺ〉
    〈enumeration value=ʺ1ʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄restriction〉
〈⁄simpleType〉

〈!-- End of schema. --〉
〈⁄schema〉

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


XML templates⁄schema for lowbalance-poll-1.0

*	Template: The templates for lowbalance-poll-1.0 can be found in Chapter 3, EPP Command 
Mapping of the relevant EPP documentation, http:⁄⁄www.verisigninc.com⁄assets⁄low-balance-
mapping.pdf.

*	Schema: This schema describes the extension mapping for the account low balance 
notification. The mapping extends the EPP base mapping so an account holder can be 
notified via EPP poll messages whenever the available credit for an account reaches or goes 
below the credit threshold.

〈?xml version=ʺ1.0ʺ encoding=ʺUTF-8ʺ?〉

〈schema targetNamespace=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄lowbalance-poll-1.0ʺ
  xmlns:lowbalance-poll=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.Verisign.com⁄epp⁄lowbalance-poll-1.0ʺ
  xmlns:eppcom=ʺurn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0ʺ
  xmlns=ʺhttp:⁄⁄www.w3.org⁄2001⁄XMLSchemaʺ
  elementFormDefault=ʺqualifiedʺ〉

〈!-- Import common element types.--〉
〈import namespace=ʺurn:ietf:params:xml:ns:eppcom-1.0ʺ
  schemaLocation=ʺeppcom-1.0.xsdʺ⁄〉

〈annotation〉
  〈documentation〉
    Extensible Provisioning Protocol v1.0
    Verisign poll notification specification for low balance notifications.
  〈⁄documentation〉
〈⁄annotation〉

〈!--Child elements found in EPP commands.--〉
〈element name=ʺpollDataʺ type=ʺlowbalance-poll:pollDataTypeʺ⁄〉

〈!--Child elements of the 〈notifyData〉 element for the low balance.--〉
〈complexType name=ʺpollDataTypeʺ〉
  〈sequence〉
    〈element name=ʺregistrarNameʺ type=ʺeppcom:labelTypeʺ⁄〉
    〈element name=ʺcreditLimitʺ type=ʺnormalizedStringʺ⁄〉
    〈element name=ʺcreditThresholdʺ
      type=ʺlowbalance-poll:thresholdTypeʺ⁄〉
    〈element name=ʺavailableCreditʺ type=ʺnormalizedStringʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄sequence〉
〈⁄complexType〉

〈complexType name=ʺthresholdTypeʺ〉
  〈simpleContent〉
    〈extension base=ʺnormalizedStringʺ〉
      〈attribute name=ʺtypeʺ
        type=ʺlowbalance-poll:thresholdValueTypeʺ
        use=ʺrequiredʺ⁄〉
    〈⁄extension〉
  〈⁄simpleContent〉
〈⁄complexType〉

〈simpleType name=ʺthresholdValueTypeʺ〉
  〈restriction base=ʺtokenʺ〉
    〈enumeration value=ʺFIXEDʺ⁄〉
    〈enumeration value=ʺPERCENTʺ⁄〉
  〈⁄restriction〉
〈⁄simpleType〉

〈!-- End of schema.--〉
〈⁄schema〉


6	PROPRIETARY EPP EXTENSION CONSISTENCY WITH REGISTRATION LIFECYCLE
 
Verisign’s proprietary EPP extensions, defined in Section 5 above, are consistent with the 
registration lifecycle documented in the response to Question 27, Registration Lifecycle.  Details 
of the registration lifecycle are presented in that response. As new registry features are 
required, we develop proprietary EPP extensions to address new operational requirements. 
Consistent with ICANN procedures we adhere to all applicable Registry Services Evaluation 
Process (RSEP) procedures.

1 COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF THIS ASPECT OF REGISTRY TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS

Verisign has operated the Whois lookup service for the gTLDs and ccTLDs we manage since
1991, and will provide these proven services for the .verisign gTLD registry. In addition, we
continue to work with the Internet community to improve the utility of Whois data, while thwarting
its application for abusive uses.

1.1 High-Level Whois System Description

Like all other components of our registry service, our Whois system is designed and built for
both reliability and performance in full compliance with applicable RFCs. Our current Whois
implementation has answered more than five billion Whois queries per month for the TLDs we
manage, and has experienced more than 250,000 queries per minute in peak conditions. The
proposed gTLD uses a Whois system design and approach that is comparable to the current
implementation. Independent quality control testing ensures our Whois service is RFC-
compliant through all phases of its lifecycle.

Our redundant Whois databases further contribute to overall system availability and reliability.
The hardware and software for our Whois service is architected to scale both horizontally (by
adding more servers) and vertically (by adding more CPUs and memory to existing servers) to
meet future need.

We can fine-tune access to our Whois database on an individual Internet Protocol (IP) address
basis, and we work with registrars to help ensure their services are not limited by any restriction
placed on Whois. We provide near real-time updates for Whois services for the TLDs under our
management. As information is updated in the registration database, it is propagated to the
Whois servers for quick publication. These updates align with the near real-time publication of
Domain Name System (DNS) information as it is updated in the registration database. This
capability is important for the .verisign gTLD registry as it is Verisign’s experience that when
DNS data is updated in near real time, so should Whois data be updated to reflect the
registration specifics of those domain names.

Verisign’s Whois response time has been less than 500 milliseconds for 95 percent of all Whois
queries in .com, .net, .tv, and .cc. The response time in these TLDs, combined with our
capacity, enables the Whois system to respond to up to 30,000 searches (or queries) per
second for a total capacity of 2.6 billion queries per day.

The Whois software written by Verisign complies with RFC 3912. We use an advanced in-
memory database technology to provide exceptional overall system performance and security.
In accordance with RFC 3912, we provide a website at whois.nic.〈TLD〉 that provides free
public query-based access to the registration data.

We currently operate both thin and thick Whois systems.

Verisign commits to implementing a RESTful Whois service upon finalization of the relevant standards and protocols by the IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force).

Provided Functionalities for User Interface

To use the Whois service via port 43, the user enters the applicable parameter on the command
line as illustrated here:

* For domain name: whois EXAMPLE.TLD
* For registrar: whois ʺregistrar Example Registrar, Inc.ʺ
* For name server: whois ʺNS1.EXAMPLE.TLDʺ or whois ʺname server (IP address)ʺ

To use the Whois service via the web-based directory service search interface:

* Go to http:⁄⁄whois.nic.〈TLD〉
* Click on the appropriate button (Domain, Registrar, or Name Server)
* Enter the applicable parameter:
a. Domain name, including the TLD (e.g., EXAMPLE.TLD)
b. Full name of the registrar, including punctuation (e.g., Example Registrar, Inc.)
c. Full host name or the IP address (e.g., NS1.EXAMPLE.TLD or 198.41.3.39)
* Click on the Submit button.

Provisions to Ensure That Access Is Limited to Legitimate Authorized Users and Is in Compliance with Applicable Privacy Laws or Policies

To further promote reliable and secure Whois operations, Verisign has implemented rate-limiting
characteristics within the Whois service software. For example, to prevent data mining or other
abusive behavior, the service can throttle a specific requestor if the query rate exceeds a
configurable threshold. In addition, QoS technology enables rate limiting of queries before they
reach the servers, which helps protect against denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks.

Our software also permits restrictions on search capabilities. For example, wild card searches
can be disabled. If needed, it is possible to temporarily restrict and⁄or block requests coming
from specific IP addresses for a configurable amount of time. Additional features that are
configurable in the Whois software include help files, headers and footers for Whois query
responses, statistics, and methods to memory map the database. Furthermore, we are
European Union (EU) Safe Harbor certified and have worked with European data protection
authorities to address applicable privacy laws by developing a tiered Whois access structure
that requires users who require access to more extensive data to (i) identify themselves, (ii)
confirm that their use is for a specified purpose and (iii) enter into an agreement governing their
use of the more extensive Whois data.

1.2 Relevant Network Diagrams

Figure 26-1 (see Attachment VRSN_.verisign_Q26_Figures for all figures in this response)
provides a summary network diagram of the Whois service provided by Verisign. The figure
details the configuration with one resolution⁄Whois site. For the .verisign gTLD, we provide
Whois service from six of our 17 primary sites based on the proposed gTLD’s traffic volume and
patterns. A functionally equivalent resolution architecture configuration exists at each Whois
site.

1.3 IT and Infrastructure Resources

Figure 26-2 summarizes the IT and infrastructure resources that Verisign uses to provision
Whois services from Verisign primary resolution sites. As needed, virtual machines are created
based on actual and projected demand.

1.4 Description of Interconnectivity with Other Registry Systems

Figure 26-3 provides a technical overview of Verisign’s registry system, and shows how the
Whois service component fits into this larger system and interconnects with other system
components.

1.5 Frequency of Synchronization Between Servers

Synchronization between the SRS and the geographically distributed Whois resolution sites
occurs approximately every three minutes. We use a two-part Whois update process to ensure
Whois data is accurate and available. Every 12 hours an initial file is distributed to each
resolution site. This file is a complete copy of all Whois data fields associated with each domain
name under management. As interactions with the SRS cause the Whois data to be changed,
these incremental changes are distributed to the resolution sites as an incremental file update.
This incremental update occurs approximately every three minutes. When the new 12-hour full
update is distributed, this file includes all past incremental updates. Our approach to frequency
of synchronization between servers meets the Performance Specifications defined in
Specification 10 of the Registry Agreement for new gTLDs.

2 TECHNICAL PLAN SCOPE⁄SCALE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

Our scaling models are proven predictors of needed capacity and related cost. As such, they
provide the means to link the projected infrastructure needs of the .verisign gTLD with
necessary implementation and sustainment cost. Using the projected usage volume for the
most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as
an input to our scaling models, we derived the necessary infrastructure required to implement
and sustain this gTLD. Cost related to this infrastructure is provided as “Total Critical Registry
Function Cash Outflows” (Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections
response.

3 TECHNICAL PLAN THAT IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION
As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed a set of proprietary resourcing
models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. We
routinely adjust these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These
models enable us to continually right-size our staff to accommodate projected demand and
meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the
projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 –
Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to our staffing models, we derived the necessary
personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance.
Cost related to this infrastructure is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows”
(Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

We employ more than 1,040 individuals of which more than 775 comprise our technical work
force. (Current statistics are publicly available in our quarterly filings.) Drawing from this pool of
on-hand and fully committed technical resources, we have maintained DNS operational
accuracy and stability 100 percent of the time for more than 13 years for .com, proving our
ability to align personnel resource growth to the scale increases of our TLD service offerings.

We project we will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the
response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support Whois services:
* Application Engineers: 19
* Database Engineers: 3
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11

4 COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT RFC

Verisign’s Whois service complies with the data formats defined in Specification 4 of the
Registry Agreement. We will provision Whois services for registered domain names and
associated data in the top-level domain (TLD). Our Whois services are accessible over Internet
Protocol version 4 (IPv4) and Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6), via both Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP) port 43 and a web-based directory service at whois.nic.〈TLD〉, which in
accordance with RFC 3912, provides free public query-based access to domain name, registrar,
and name server lookups. Our proposed Whois system meets all requirements as defined by
ICANN for each registry under our management. Evidence of this successful implementation,
and thus compliance with the applicable RFCs, can be verified by a review of the .com and .net
Registry Operator’s Monthly Reports that we file with ICANN. These reports provide evidence of
our ability to meet registry operation service level agreements (SLAs) comparable to those
detailed in Specification 10. The reports are accessible at the following URL:
http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄monthly-reports⁄.

5 COMPLIANCE WITH SPECIFICATIONS 4 AND 10 OF REGISTRY AGREEMENT

In accordance with Specification 4, Verisign provides a Whois service that is available via both
port 43 in accordance with RFC 3912, and a web-based directory service at whois.nic.〈TLD〉
also in accordance with RFC 3912, thereby providing free public query-based access. We
acknowledge that ICANN reserves the right to specify alternative formats and protocols, and
upon such specification, we will implement such alternative specification as soon as reasonably
practicable.

The format of the following data fields conforms to the mappings specified in Extensible
Provisioning Protocol (EPP) RFCs 5730 – 5734 so the display of this information (or values
returned in Whois responses) can be uniformly processed and understood: domain name
status, individual and organizational names, address, street, city, state⁄province, postal code,
country, telephone and fax numbers, email addresses, date, and times.

Specifications for data objects, bulk access, and lookups comply with Specification 4 and are
detailed in the following subsections, provided in both bulk access and lookup modes.
Bulk Access Mode. This data is provided on a daily schedule to a party designated from time
to time in writing by ICANN. The specification of the content and format of this data, and the
procedures for providing access, shall be as stated below, until revised in the ICANN Registry
Agreement.

The data is provided in three files:

* Domain Name File: For each domain name, the file provides the domain name, server
name for each name server, registrar ID, and updated date.

* Name Server File: For each registered name server, the file provides the server name,
each IP address, registrar ID, and updated date.

* Registrar File: For each registrar, the following data elements are provided: registrar ID,
registrar address, registrar telephone number, registrar email address, Whois server,
referral URL, updated date, and the name, telephone number, and email address of all
the registrarʹs administrative, billing, and technical contacts.

Lookup Mode. Figures 26-4 through Figure 26-6 provide the query and response format for
domain name, registrar, and name server data objects.

5.1 Specification 10, RDDS Registry Performance Specifications

Verisign’s Whois service meets all registration data directory services (RDDS) registry
performance specifications detailed in Specification 10, Section 2. Evidence of this performance
can be verified by a review of the .com and .net Registry Operator’s Monthly Reports that we file
monthly with ICANN. These reports are accessible from the ICANN website at the following
URL: http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄tlds⁄monthly-reports⁄.

In accordance with RDDS registry performance specifications detailed in Specification 10, our
Whois service meets the following proven performance attributes:

* RDDS availability: Less than or equal to 864 min of downtime (approximately 98%)
* RDDS query RTT: Less than or equal to 2000 ms, for at least 95% of the queries
* RDDS update time: Less than or equal to 60 min, for at least 95% of the probes

6 SEARCHABLE WHOIS

Verisign provides a searchable Whois service for the .verisign gTLD. We have experience in
providing tiered access to Whois for the .name registry, and we use these methods and control
structures to help reduce potential malicious use of the function. The searchable Whois system
currently uses Apache’s Lucene full text search engine to index relevant Whois content with
near-real time incremental updates from the provisioning system.

Features of our searchable Whois function include:

* Provision of a web-based searchable directory service

* Ability to perform partial match, at least, for the following data fields: domain name,
contacts and registrant’s name, and contact and registrant’s postal address, including all
the sub-fields described in EPP (e.g., street, city, state, or province)

* Ability to perform exact match, at least, on the following fields: registrar ID, name server
name, and name server’s IP address (only applies to IP addresses stored by the
registry, i.e., glue records)

* Ability to perform Boolean search supporting, at least, the following logical operators to
join a set of search criteria: AND, OR, NOT

* Search results that include domain names that match the selected search criteria

Our implementation of searchable Whois is EU Safe Harbor certified and includes appropriate
access control measures that help ensure that only legitimate authorized users can use the
service. Furthermore, our compliance office monitors current ICANN policy and applicable
privacy laws or policies to help ensure the solution is maintained within compliance of applicable
regulations. Features of these access control measures include:

* All unauthenticated searches are returned as thin results.

* Registry system authentication is used to grant access to appropriate users for thick
Whois data search results.

* Account access is granted by our defined .verisign gTLD admin user.

Potential Forms of Abuse and Related Risk Mitigation

Leveraging our experience providing tiered access to Whois for the .name registry and
interacting with ICANN, data protection authorities, and applicable industry groups,
we are knowledgeable of the likely data mining forms of abuse associated with a searchable
Whois service. Figure 26-7 summarizes these potential forms of abuse and our approach
to mitigate the identified risk.

1 COMPLETE KNOWLEDGE AND UNDERSTANDING OF REGISTRATION LIFECYCLES AND STATES

Starting with domain name registration and continuing through domain name delete operations,
Verisign’s registry implements the full registration lifecycle for domain names supporting the
operations in the Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) specification. The registration lifecycle
of the domain name starts with registration and traverses various states as specified in the
following sections. The registry system provides options to update domain names with different
server and client status codes that block operations based on the EPP specification. The
system also provides different grace periods for different billable operations, where the price of
the billable operation is credited back to the registrar if the billable operation is removed within
the grace period. Together Figure 27-1 and Figure 27-2 (see Attachment VRSN_.verisign_Q27_
Figures for all figures in this response) define the registration states comprising the registration
lifecycle and explain the trigger points that cause state-to-state transitions. States are
represented as green rectangles within Figure 27-1.

1.1 Registration Lifecycle of Create⁄Update⁄Delete

The following section details the create⁄update⁄delete processes and the related renewal
process that we follow. For each process, this response defines the process function and its
characterization, and as appropriate provides a process flow chart.

Create Process

The domain name lifecycle begins with a registration or what is referred to as
a Domain Name Create operation in EPP. The system fully supports the EPP Domain Name
Mapping as defined by RFC 5731, where the associated objects (e.g., hosts and contacts) are
created independent of the domain name.

Process Characterization.The Domain Name Create command is received, validated, run
through a set of business rules, persisted to the database, and committed in the database if all
business rules pass. The domain name is included with the data flow to the DNS and Whois
resolution services. If no name servers are supplied, the domain name is not included with the
data flow to the DNS. A successfully created domain name has the created date and expiration
date set in the database. Creates are subject to grace periods as described in Section 1.3 of
this response, Add Grace Period, Redemption Grace Period, and Notice Periods for Renewals
or Transfers.

The Domain Name Create operation is detailed in Figure 27-3 and requires the following
attributes:
* A domain name that meets the string restrictions.

* A domain name that does not already exist.

* The registrar is authorized to create a domain name in .verisign.
* The registrar has available credit.

* A valid Authorization Information (Auth-Info) value.

* Required contacts (e.g., registrant, administrative contact, technical contact, and billing
contact) are specified and exist.

* The specified name servers (hosts) exist, and there is a maximum of 13 name servers.

* A period in units of years with a maximum value of 10 (default period is one year).

Renewal Process

The domain name can be renewed unless it has any form of Pending Delete, Pending Transfer,
or Renew Prohibited.

A request for renewal that sets the expiry date to more than ten years in the future is denied.
The registrar must pass the current expiration date (without the timestamp) to support the
idempotent features of EPP, where sending the same command a second time does not cause
unexpected side effects.

Automatic renewal occurs when a domain name expires. On the expiration date, the registry
extends the registration period one year and debits the registrar account balance. In the case of
an auto-renewal of the domain name, a separate Auto-Renew grace period applies. Renewals
are subject to grace periods as described in Section 1.3 of this response, Add Grace Period,
Redemption Grace Period, and Notice Periods for Renewals or Transfers.

Process Characterization. The Domain Name Renew command is received, validated,
authorized, and run through a set of business rules. The data is updated and committed in the
database if it passes all business rules. The updated domain name’s expiration date is included
in the flow to the Whois resolution service.

The Domain Name Renew operation is detailed in Figure 27-4 and requires the following
attributes:

* A domain name that exists and is sponsored by the requesting registrar.

* The registrar is authorized to renew a domain name in .verisign.

* The registrar has available credit.

* The passed current expiration date matches the domain name’s expiration date.

* A period in units of years with a maximum value of 10 (default period is one year). A domain
name expiry past ten years is not allowed.

Registrar Transfer Procedures

A registrant may transfer his⁄her domain name from his⁄her current registrar to another registrar.
The database system allows a transfer as long as the transfer is not within the initial 60 days,
per industry standard, of the original registration date.

The registrar transfer process goes through many process states, which are described in detail
below, unless it has any form of Pending Delete, Pending Transfer, or Transfer Prohibited.
A transfer can only be initiated when the appropriate Auth-Info is supplied. The Auth-Info for
transfer is only available to the current registrar. Any other registrar requesting to initiate a
transfer on behalf of a registrant must obtain the Auth-Info from the registrant.

The Auth-Info is made available to the registrant upon request. The registrant is the only party
other than the current registrar that has access to the Auth-Info. Registrar transfer entails a
specified extension of the expiry date for the object. The registrar transfer is a billable operation
and is charged identically to a renewal for the same extension of the period. This period can be
from one to ten years, in one-year increments.

Because registrar transfer involves an extension of the registration period, the rules and policies
applying to how the resulting expiry date is set after transfer are based on the renewal policies
on extension.

Per industry standard, a domain name cannot be transferred to another registrar within the first
60 days after registration. This restriction continues to apply if the domain name is renewed
during the first 60 days. Transfer of the domain name changes the sponsoring registrar of the
domain name, and also changes the child hosts (ns1.sample.xyz) of the domain name (sample
.xyz).

The domain name transfer consists of five separate operations:

* Transfer Request (Figure 27-5): Executed by a non-sponsoring registrar with the valid
Auth-Info provided by the registrant. The Transfer Request holds funds of the requesting
registrar but does not bill the registrar until the transfer is completed. The sponsoring
registrar receives a Transfer Request poll message.

* Transfer Cancel (Figure 27-6): Executed by the requesting registrar to cancel the pending
transfer. The held funds of the requesting registrar are reversed. The sponsoring registrar
receives a Transfer Cancel poll message.

* Transfer Approve (Figure 27-7): Executed by the sponsoring registrar to approve the
Transfer Request. The requesting registrar is billed for the Transfer Request and the
sponsoring registrar is credited for an applicable Auto-Renew grace period. The requesting
registrar receives a Transfer Approve poll message.

* Transfer Reject (Figure 27-8): Executed by the sponsoring registrar to reject the pending
transfer. The held funds of the requesting registrar are reversed. The requesting registrar
receives a Transfer Reject poll message.

* Transfer Query (Figure 27-9): Executed by either the requesting registrar or the sponsoring
registrar of the last transfer.

The registry auto-approves a transfer if the sponsoring registrar takes no action. The requesting
registrar is billed for the Transfer Request and the sponsoring registrar is credited for an
applicable Auto-Renew grace period. The requesting registrar and the sponsoring registrar
receive a Transfer Auto-Approve poll message.

Delete Process

A registrar may choose to delete the domain name at any time.

Process Characterization. The domain name can be deleted, unless it has any form of
Pending Delete, Pending Transfer, or Delete Prohibited.

A domain name is also prohibited from deletion if it has any in-zone child hosts that are name
servers for domain names. For example, the domain name “sample.xyz” cannot be deleted if an
in-zone host “ns.sample.xyz” exists and is a name server for “sample2.xyz.”

If the Domain Name Delete occurs within the Add grace period, the domain name is
immediately deleted and the sponsoring registrar is credited for the Domain Name Create. If the
Domain Name Delete occurs outside the Add grace period, it follows the Redemption grace
period (RGP) lifecycle.

Update Process

The sponsoring registrar can update the following attributes of a domain name:

* Auth-Info

* Name servers

* Contacts (i.e., registrant, administrative contact, technical contact, and billing contact)

* Statuses (e.g., Client Delete Prohibited, Client Hold, Client Renew Prohibited, Client
Transfer Prohibited, Client Update Prohibited)

Process Characterization. Updates are allowed provided that the update includes the removal
of any Update Prohibited status. The Domain Name Update operation is detailed in Figure
27-10.

A domain name can be updated unless it has any form of Pending Delete, Pending Transfer, or
Update Prohibited.

1.2 Pending, Locked, Expired, and Transferred

Verisign handles pending, locked, expired, and transferred domain names as described here.
When the domain name is deleted after the five-day Add grace period, it enters into the Pending
Delete state. The registrant can return its domain name to active any time within the five-day
Pending Delete grace period. After the five-day Pending Delete grace period expires, the
domain name enters the Redemption Pending state and then is deleted by the system. The
registrant can restore the domain name at any time during the Redemption Pending state.
When a non-sponsoring registrar initiates the domain name transfer request, the domain name
enters Pending Transfer state and a notification is mailed to the sponsoring registrar for
approvals. If the sponsoring registrar doesn’t respond within five days, the Pending Transfer
expires and the transfer request is automatically approved.

EPP specifies both client (registrar) and server (registry) status codes that can be used to
prevent registry changes that are not intended by the registrant. Currently, many registrars use
the client status codes to protect against inadvertent modifications that would affect their
customers’ high-profile or valuable domain names.

Our registry service supports the following client (registrar) and server (registry) status codes:
* clientHold
* clientRenewProhibited
* clientTransferProhibited
* clientUpdateProhibited
* clientDeleteProhibited
* serverHold
* serverRenewProhibited
* serverTransferProhibited
* serverUpdateProhibited
* serverDeleteProhibited

1.3 Add Grace Period, Redemption Grace Period, and Notice Periods for Renewals or Transfers

Verisign handles Add grace periods, Redemption grace periods, and notice periods for renewals
or transfers as described here.

* Add Grace Period: The Add grace period is a specified number of days following the initial
registration of the domain name. The current value of the Add grace period for all registrars
is five days.

* Redemption Grace Period: If the domain name is deleted after the five-day grace period
expires, it enters the Redemption grace period and then is deleted by the system. The
registrant has an option to use the Restore Request command to restore the domain name
within the Redemption grace period. In this scenario, the domain name goes to Pending
Restore state if there is a Restore Request command within 30 days of the Redemption
grace period. From the Pending Restore state, it goes either to the OK state, if there is a
Restore Report Submission command within seven days of the Restore Request grace
period, or a Redemption Period state if there is no Restore Report Submission command
within seven days of the Restore Request grace period.

* Renew Grace Period: The Renew⁄Extend grace period is a specified number of days
following the renewal⁄extension of the domain name’s registration period. The current value
of the Renew⁄Extend grace period is five days.

* Auto-Renew Grace Period: All auto-renewed domain names have a grace period of 45
days.

* Transfer Grace Period: Domain names have a five-day Transfer grace period.

1.4 Aspects of the Registration Lifecycle Not Covered by Standard EPP RFCs

Verisign’s registration lifecycle processes and code implementations adhere to the standard
EPP RFCs related to the registration lifecycle. By adhering to the RFCs, our registration
lifecycle is complete and addresses each registration-related task comprising the lifecycle. No
aspect of our registration lifecycle is not covered by one of the standard EPP RFCs and thus no
additional definitions are provided in this response.

2 CONSISTENCY WITH ANY SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS MADE TO REGISTRANTS AS ADAPTED TO THE OVERALL
BUSINESS APPROACH FOR THE PROPOSED gTLD

The registration lifecycle described above applies to the .verisign gTLD as well as other TLDs
managed by Verisign; thus we remain consistent with commitments made to our registrants. No
unique or specific registration lifecycle modifications or adaptations are required to support the
overall business approach for the .verisign gTLD.

To accommodate a range of registries, our registry implementation is capable of offering both a
thin and thick Whois implementation, which is also built upon our award-winning ATLAS
infrastructure.

3 COMPLIANCE WITH RELEVANT RFCs

Verisign’s registration lifecycle complies with applicable RFCs, specifically RFCs 5730 – 5734
and 3915. The system fully supports the EPP Domain Name Mapping as defined by RFC 5731,
where the associated objects (e.g., hosts and contacts) are created independent of the domain
name.

In addition, in accordance with RFCs 5732 and 5733, our registration system enforces the
following domain name registration constraints:

* Uniqueness⁄Multiplicity: A second-level domain name is unique in the .verisign database.
Two identical second-level domain names cannot simultaneously exist in .verisign. Further,
a second-level domain name cannot be created if it conflicts with a reserved domain name.

* Point of Contact Associations: The domain name is associated with the following points of
contact. Contacts are created and managed independently according to RFC 5733.
a. Registrant
b. Administrative contact
c. Technical contact
d. Billing contact

*. Domain Name Associations: Each domain name is associated with:
a. A maximum of 13 hosts, which are created and managed independently according to RFC 5732
b. An Auth-Info, which is used to authorize certain operations on the object
c. Status(es), which are used to describe the domain name’s status in the registry
d. A created date, updated date, and expiry date

4 DEMONSTRATES THAT TECHNICAL RESOURCES REQUIRED TO CARRY THROUGH THE PLANS FOR THIS ELEMENT
ARE ALREADY ON HAND OR READILY AVAILABLE

As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed a set of proprietary resourcing
models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. We
routinely adjust these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These
models enable us to continually right-size staff to accommodate projected demand and meet
service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the
projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 –
Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to our staffing models, we derived the necessary
personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance.
Cost related to this infrastructure is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows”
(Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

Verisign employs more than 1,040 individuals of which more than 775 comprise our technical
work force. (Current statistics are publicly available in our quarterly filings.) Drawing from this
pool of on-hand and fully committed technical resources, we have maintained DNS operational
accuracy and stability 100 percent of the time for more than 13 years for .com, proving our
ability to align personnel resource growth to the scale increases of our TLD service offerings.

We project we will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the
response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support the registration
lifecycle:
* Application Engineers: 19
* Customer Support Personnel: 36
* Database Administrators: 8
* Database Engineers: 3
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11
* SRS System Administrators: 13

1. COMPREHENSIVE ABUSE POLICIES, WHICH INCLUDE CLEAR DEFINITIONS OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A
BUSE IN THE TLD, AND PROCEDURES THAT WILL EFFECTIVELY MINIMIZE POTENTIAL FOR ABUSE IN THE TLD

Because the .verisign gTLD is used solely by Verisign and not as a gTLD for others to utilize,
the potential for domain name abuse is greatly reduced.

Registrations of domain names for the .verisign gTLD may only be performed by an authorized
registrant acting on behalf of VeriSign, Inc. All domain name registrations in the gTLD are
registered to and maintained by VeriSign, Inc. for our own exclusive use. VeriSign, Inc. does not
sell, distribute, or transfer control or use of any registrations in the gTLD to any third party that is
not an affiliate. We implement registration policies that (i) require Verisign to approve any and all
registrations; (ii) require all registrations to be in the name of Verisign and⁄or our affiliates; and
(iii) require that control of such registrations and their use remain with Verisign and ⁄or our
affiliates and partners.

Potential abuse is largely limited to the following areas:

* Phishing. Verisign defines phishing as the use of fraudulent web pages that are designed to
trick recipients into divulging sensitive data such as user names or passwords. The .verisign
gTLD will increase Internet users’ trust by allowing them to more easily identify the landing
pages of our products and services as authentically Verisign’s and not those of a third party
that may be spoofing the site or operating a phishing scam. The .verisign gTLD provides
credibility that the inventions and data we share through this gTLD come directly from
Verisign.

* Willful Distribution of Malware: Verisign defines the willful distribution of malware as the
dissemination of software designed to infiltrate or damage a computer system without the
ownerʹs informed consent. Examples include, without limitation, computer viruses, worms,
keylogging, and trojan horses. Verisign, as the trusted provider of registry services for the
world’s largest TLDs (e.g., .com and .net), is uniquely positioned to detect malware attacks
on our sites. We have developed proprietary code to help identify malware in the zones we
manage, which in turn enables us to identify malicious code hidden in our own domain
names. Our malware scanning service helps prevent our websites from infecting other
websites by scanning web pages for embedded malicious content that could potentially
infect visitors’ websites. Our malware scanning technology uses a combination of in-depth
malware behavioral analysis, anti-virus results, detailed malware patterns, and network
analysis to discover known exploits for the particular scanned zone.

1.1 Abuse Prevention and Mitigation Implementation Plan

Second-Level Domain Name Registration

We use the .verisign gTLD in the promotion and communication of the new Verisign brand and
in product marketing efforts. We may use second-level domain names to create secure and
personalized access to content, resources, and information for these brand and product
marketing efforts. The .verisign second- level domains are registered exclusively by VeriSign,
Inc. (“Verisign”) and are not available to the general public. Only authorized employees of
Verisign are permitted to register .verisign domain names on behalf of Verisign or an eligible
affiliate. Second-level domains are signed using DNSSEC, secured with Verisign’s Registry
Lock service, scanned for malware using MalDetector, and monitored using our suite of security
tools.

Website Visitors

The .verisign gTLD serves as the destination point for our channel and alliance partners. We
use .verisign second-level domain names as secure, personalized entry points that partners can
access. Each custom entry point provides customized co-marketing assets, information, and
other resources relevant to the partner’s business and ⁄ or its customers’ needs. Verisign
controls all content.

We ask customers for consent to collect personal information for the following purposes:

* Email Request for Information or Registrations for Guides or Seminars. Links
throughout our website enable customers to contact us via email to ask questions, request
information and materials, register for guides or seminars, or provide comments and
suggestions. We also offer customers the opportunity to have one of our representatives
contact them personally to provide additional information about our products or services. To
help us satisfy the customer’s request, we may request additional personal information,
such as the customer’s name and telephone number.

* Enrollment. If a customer enrolls for one of our products or services, we request certain
information. Depending on the type of product or service, we may ask the customer to
provide his⁄her name, address, telephone number, email address, credit card number, bank
account information, IP address, and⁄or Social Security number.

We take reasonable steps to protect this personal data from loss, misuse, unauthorized
disclosure, alteration, or destruction. We do not use or authorize the use of personal data in a
way that is incompatible with the verification and confirmation of the customer authorized use of
the data. In addition, at a minimum, we scan the website daily to ensure customers are not
exposed to malicious code.

1.2 Policies for Handling Complaints Regarding Abuse

Verisign will handle complaints regarding abuse as detailed in this section.

Medium for External Complaints

External users of the system who have an abuse complaint (i.e., a researcher complaining of
botnet activity or a user complaining of malware infection) can call Verisign Customer Service.
Verisign’s Customer Service includes the 24⁄7 onsite Customer Service Center (CSC) staff and
on-call support from Tier 3 teams (e.g., registry operations staff, engineers, and developers)
during non-business hours. Our primary concern is to resolve issues quickly and as such, we
maintain a formal escalation process to ensure that all issues are addressed promptly by the
“right” person⁄teams.

The CSC staff accepts every external complaint of malicious abuse of the .verisign gTLD’s
domain names, websites, or Domain Name System (DNS).

Our key performance metrics support timely response to customers’ complaints of abuse. Our
CSC answers 90 percent of phone calls within 20 seconds. Team leads actively manage all
access channels to ensure appropriate responsiveness via each access channel.

Medium for Internal Complaints

Because the .verisign gTLD is used exclusively by Verisign, it is not available to the general
public. Only Verisign and its affiliates are permitted to be registrants of .verisign domain names.
Any security incidents or breaches noted by the registrant are reported to Verisign’s formal
Incident Response Team.

The Incident Response Team (IRT) is supported by a Corporate Incident Management Team
(CIMT) and business-unit Business Continuity teams. These teams respond to and manage any
incident or disaster that impacts Verisign employees, operations, environments, or facilities. To
provide a secure and sound backup operational environment, our IT disaster recovery site has
implemented the physical security protections and operational controls required by Verisign’s
overall Physical Security Program and Verisign’s overall Information Security Program. In the
event of an incident or disaster that requires temporary or permanent cessation of operations
from Verisignʹs primary facility, the Verisign IRT and CIMT initiate Verisignʹs business continuity
and IT disaster recovery process.

1.3 Proposed Measures for Removal of Orphan Glue Records

Although orphan glue records often support correct and ordinary operation of the DNS, registry
operators are required to remove orphan glue records (as defined at
http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄committees⁄security⁄sac048.pdf) when provided with evidence in written
form that such records are present in connection with malicious conduct. Verisign’s registration
system is specifically designed to not allow orphan glue records. Registrars are required to
delete⁄move all dependent DNS records before they are allowed to delete the parent domain.

To prevent orphan glue records, we perform the following checks before removing a domain or
name server:

Checks during domain delete:

* Parent domain delete is not allowed if any other domain in the zone refers to the child name
server.

* If the parent domain is the only domain using the child name server, then both the domain
and the glue record are removed from the zone.

Check during explicit name server delete:

* We confirm that the current name server is not referenced by any domain name (in-zone)
before deleting the name server.

Zone-file impact:

* If the parent domain references the child name server AND if other domains in the zone also
reference it AND if the parent domain name is assigned a serverHold status, then the parent
domain goes out of the zone but the name server glue record does not.

* If no domains reference a name server, then the zone file removes the glue record.

1.4 Resourcing Plans

Details related to resourcing plans for the initial implementation and ongoing maintenance of
Verisign’s abuse plan are provided in Section 2 of this response.

1.5 Measures to Promote Whois Accuracy

Because .verisign is used exclusively by Verisign, it is not available to the general public. Only
authorized employees of Verisign are permitted to register .verisign domain names on behalf of
Verisign or an affiliate, and each registered domain name has Verisign corporate registrant,
administrative, billing, and technical contact information.

1.5.1 Authentication of Registrant Information

Registrations of .verisign domain names require the registrant to enter a valid Verisign
employee ID to begin the registration process. Registrant data is cross referenced against the
Verisign employee directory to validate the accuracy of the contact information. In addition, as
part of the Registry-Registrar Agreement the registrar uses two-factor authentication to validate
that the registrant data is accurate. Section 1.7.2 of this response provides further details about
our two-factor authentication process.

1.5.2 Regular Monitoring of Registration Data for Accuracy and Completeness

Verisign has the capability to regularly validate registration data against our employee records
to confirm that the registration data remains accurate. We investigate and correct any
discrepancies within a reasonable period of time. Further, at least once per year and in
accordance with ICANN’s consensus policy relating to Whois accuracy, we ask each registrant
to review and confirm the validity of the Whois data for domain names for which the contact is
named.

Verisign has established policies and procedures to encourage registrar compliance with
ICANN’s Whois accuracy requirements. We incorporate the following services into our full-
service registry operations.

Registrar self certification

The self-certification program consists, in part, of evaluations applied equally to all operational
ICANN accredited registrars and conducted from time to time throughout the year. Process
steps are as follows:

* Verisign sends an email notification to the ICANN primary registrar contact, requesting that
the contact go to a designated URL, log in with his⁄her Web ID and password, and complete
and submit the online form. The contact must submit the form within 15 business days of
receipt of the notification.

* When the form is submitted, we send the registrar an automated email confirming that the
form was successfully submitted.

* We review the submitted form to ensure the certifications are compliant.

* We send the registrar an email notification if the registrar is found to be compliant in all
areas.

* If a review of the response indicates that the registrar is out of compliance or if we have
follow-up questions, the registrar has 10 days to respond to the inquiry.

* If the registrar does not respond within 15 business days of receiving the original
notification, or if it does not respond to the request for additional information, we send the
registrar a Breach Notice and give the registrar 30 days to cure the breach.

* If the registrar does not cure the breach, we terminate the Registry-Registrar Agreement
(RRA).

Whois Data Reminder Process

Verisign regularly reminds registrars of their obligation to comply with ICANN’s Whois Data
Reminder Policy, which was adopted by ICANN as a consensus policy on 27 March 2003
(http:⁄⁄www.icann.org⁄en⁄registrars⁄wdrp.htm). We send a notice to all registrars once a year
reminding them of their obligation to be diligent in validating the Whois information provided
during the registration process, to investigate claims of fraudulent Whois information, and to
cancel domain name registrations for which Whois information is determined to be invalid.

1.6 Malicious or Abusive Behavior Definitions, Metrics, and Service Level Requirements
for Resolution

Please see Section 1.0 for the definition of potential forms of abuse specific to the .verisign
gTLD. See Section 3.2.2 for a definition of Verisign’s response procedures.
The initial response from Customer Service should be within 20 seconds or less for 90 percent
of the phone calls. Verification of malicious activity and removal of confirmed malicious
infections is completed within 24 hours.

1.7 Controls to Ensure Proper Access to Domain Functions

The following sections describe various controls that Verisign employs to ensure appropriate
access to domain functions.

1.7.1 Registration Eligibility Restrictions

As noted in our response to Question 18, Mission and Purpose, Verisign intends to impose
registration eligibility restrictions to prevent the sale, distribution, or transfer of control or use of
any registration in .verisign to any third party that is not an affiliate of Verisign. These
restrictions, which require Verisign to approve all registrations before they are allowed to go live,
are implemented through provisions in the Registry-Registrar Agreement.

1.7.2 Multi-Factor Authentication

To ensure proper access to domain functions, we incorporate our Registry-Registrar Two-Factor
Authentication Service into our full-service registry operations. The service is designed to
improve domain name security and assist registrars in protecting the accounts they manage by
providing another level of assurance that only authorized personnel can communicate with the
registry. As part of the service, dynamic one-time passwords (OTPs) augment the user names
and passwords currently used to process update, transfer, and⁄or deletion requests. These one-
time passwords enable transaction processing to be based on requests that are validated both
by “what users know” (i.e., their user name and password) and “what users have” (i.e., a two-
factor authentication credential with a one-time-password).

Registrars can use the one-time-password when communicating directly with our Customer
Service department as well as when using the registrar portal to make manual updates,
transfers, and⁄or deletion transactions. The Two-Factor Authentication Service is an optional
service offered to registrars that execute the Registry-Registrar Two-Factor Authentication
Service Agreement. As shown in Figure 28-1 (see Attachment VRSN_.verisign_Q28 Figures for
all figures in this question response), the registrars’ authorized contacts use the OTP to enable
strong authentication when they contact the registry. There is no charge for the Registry-
Registrar Two-Factor Authentication Service. It is enabled only for registrars that wish to take
advantage of the added security provided by the service.

1.7.3 Requiring Multiple, Unique Points of Contact

Each user of the system is required to have an account established with a responsibility role
assigned to him⁄her. The authoritative contact for the account is the ICANN Primary Contact. In
addition the following roles are available: Billing, Technical, Legal, Administrative,
Marketing, CEO, and Technical 24⁄7. Only one user is designated as the
ICANN Primary Contact and, as such, is the authoritative contact on the account should any
conflicts arise.

2. TECHNICAL PLAN THAT IS ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED
IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed a set of proprietary resourcing
models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. We
routinely adjust these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These
models enable us to continually right-size our staff to accommodate projected demand and
meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the
projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 –
Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to our staffing models, we derived the necessary
personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance. Cost
related to this infrastructure is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows”
(Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

We project we will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the
response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support abuse
prevention and mitigation:

* Application Engineers: 19
* Business Continuity Personnel: 3
* Customer Affairs Organization: 9
* Customer Support Personnel: 36
* Information Security Engineers: 11
* Network Administrators: 11
* Network Architects: 4
* Network Operations Center (NOC) Engineers: 33
* Project Managers: 25
* Quality Assurance Engineers: 11
* Systems Architects: 9

3. POLICIES AND PROCEDURES IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE ABUSIVE USE OF REGISTERED NAMES AT STARTUP
AND ON AN ONGOING BASIS

3.1 Start-Up Anti-Abuse Policies and Procedures

Verisign incorporates the following domain name abuse prevention service into its full-service
registry operations. This service is available at the time of domain name registration.

Registry Lock

The Registry Lock Service offers server-level protection for .verisign domain names. A registry
lock can be applied during the initial standup of the domain name or at any time that the registry
is operational.

Specific Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP) status codes are set on the domain name to
prevent malicious or inadvertent modifications, deletions, and transfers. Typically, these ‘server’
level status codes can only be updated by the registry. The registrar only has ‘client’ level codes
and cannot alter ‘server’ level status codes. The registrant must provide a pass phrase to the
registry before any updates are made to the domain name. However, with Registry Lock,
registrars can also take advantage of server status codes.

The Registry Lock Service is used in conjunction with a registrar’s proprietary security measures
to bring a greater level of security to registrants’ domain names and help mitigate potential for
unintended deletions, transfers, and⁄or updates.

Two components comprise the Registry Lock Service:

* Registrars provide Verisign with a list of the domain names to be placed on the server status
codes. During the term of the service agreement, the registrar can add domain names to be
placed on the server status codes and⁄or remove domain names currently placed on the
server status codes. We then manually authenticate that the registrar submitting the list of
domain names is the registrar-of-record for such domain names.

* If registrars require changes (including updates, deletes, and transfers) to a domain name
placed on a server status code, we follow a secure, authenticated process to perform the
change. This process includes a request from a registrar-authorized representative for
Verisign to remove the specific registry status code, validation of the authorized individual by
Verisign, removal of the specified server status code, registrar completion of the desired
change, and a request from the registrar-authorized individual to reinstate the server status
code on the domain name. This process is designed to complement automated transaction
processing through the Shared Registration System (SRS) by using independent
authentication by trusted registry experts.

3.2 Ongoing Anti-Abuse Policies and Procedures

3.2.1 Policies and Procedures That Identify Malicious or Abusive Behavior

Verisign incorporates the following service into its full-service registry operations.

Malware scanning service

Registrants are often unknowing victims of malware exploits. We have developed proprietary
code to help identify malware in the zones we manage, which in turn helps us to identify
malicious code hidden in .verisign domain names.

MalDetector, our malware scanning service, helps prevent .verisign websites from infecting
other websites by scanning web pages for embedded malicious content that will infect visitors’
websites. Our malware scanning technology uses a combination of in-depth malware behavioral
analysis, anti-virus results, detailed malware patterns, and network analysis to discover known
exploits for the particular scanned zone. If malware is detected, the service sends the registrant
a report that contains the number of malicious domains found and details about malicious
content within its TLD zones. Reports with remediation instructions are provided to help the
response team quickly and effectively remove the malicious code.

3.2.2 Policies and Procedures That Address the Abusive Use of Registered Names

In the case of domain name abuse, Verisign verifies the nature of the abuse and remediates the
abuse using the procedures detailed in this section and in Figure 28-2.

Step 1.1: Verisign Notification

External party submits the abuse notification to Verisign for processing, documented by:

* Threat domain name

* Incident narrative, threat analytics, screen shots to depict abuse, and⁄or other evidence

* Threat classification

* Threat urgency description

* Recommended timeframe for action

* Technical details (e.g., Whois records, IP addresses, hash values, anti-virus detection
results⁄nomenclature, name servers, domain name statuses that are relevant to the abuse
notification)

* Contact details

Step 1.2: Registry Notification Verification

When we receive an abuse notification from a registrar⁄external party, we perform the following
verification procedures:

* Validate that all the required data appears in the notification.

* Validate that the abuse notification is for a registered domain name.

* Return a case number for tracking purposes.

Step 1.3: Complaint Rejection

If required data is missing from the abuse notification, or the domain name is not registered, the
request is rejected and returned to the registrar with the following information:

* Threat domain name

* Verisign case number

* Error reason

Step 1.4: Registrar Notification

Once we have performed the abuse mitigation, we may notify the registrar of the action taken.
Registrar notification includes the following information:

* Threat domain name

* Verisign case number

* Classification of type of domain name abuse

* Evidence of abuse

* Verisign anti-abuse contact name and number

* Action taken

* Date⁄time of action taken

Step 1.5: Registrant Notification

Once we have performed the domain name cleanup, we notify the registrant of the action taken.
Registrant notification includes the following information:

* Threat domain name

* Verisign case number

* Classification of type of domain name abuse

* Evidence of abuse

* Verisign anti-abuse contact name and number

* Action taken

Step 1.6: Website⁄Domain Cleanup

Verisign works with the registrar to complete the following steps:

* Remediation steps: Verisign runs MalDetector, our malware scanning service, to determine
the remediation needed to remove the malware.

* Additional action needed: Verisign provides additional comments to the registrar or
information to contact the Internet service provider (ISP) or hosting company for additional
action.

Step 1.7: Cleanup Acknowledgement

We notify the external party that the abuse cleanup has been completed. Acknowledgement of
the cleanup includes the following information:

* Threat domain name

* Verisign case number

* Domain name

* Verisign abuse contact name and number

* Cleanup status

4. WHEN EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REGISTRY AGREEMENT, PLANS WILL RESULT IN COMPLIANCE
WITH CONTRACTUAL REQUIREMENTS

All Verisign abuse mitigation policies are based on the corresponding terms in the Registry
Agreement and the Registry-Registrar Agreement as applicable. Whenever we develop any
policy, we look first at the language of our agreements to determine what we can and cannot do.
We then structure policies that are based on these determinations, and we develop processes
to monitor compliance with the policies.

In addition, ICANN recently asked us to participate (along with some other registries) in its 2011
Pilot Registry Self-Assessment. We are willingly cooperating with this pilot, for which we provide
ICANN with our certification that we comply with specific terms of our Registry Agreements (as
identified by ICANN).

5. TECHNICAL PLAN SCOPE⁄SCALE THAT IS CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH
AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

Our scaling models are proven predictors of needed capacity and related cost. As such, they
provide the means to link the projected infrastructure needs of the .verisign gTLD with
necessary implementation and sustainment cost. Using the projected usage volume for the
most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 – Financial Projections: Most Likely) as
an input to our scaling models, we derived the necessary infrastructure required to implement
and sustain this gTLD. Cost related to this infrastructure is provided as “Other Operating Cost”
(Template 1, Line I.L) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

1 MECHANISMS DESIGNED TO PREVENT ABUSIVE REGISTRATIONS

Rights protection is a core objective of Verisign. We will implement and adhere to any rights
protection mechanisms (RPMs) that may be mandated from time to time by ICANN, including
each mandatory RPM set forth in the Trademark Clearinghouse model contained in the Registry
Agreement, specifically Specification 7. We acknowledge that, at a minimum, ICANN requires a
Sunrise period, a Trademark Claims period, and interaction with the Trademark Clearinghouse
with respect to the registration of domain names for the .verisign gTLD. It should be noted that
because ICANN, as of the time of this application submission, has not issued final guidance with
respect to the Trademark Clearinghouse, we cannot fully detail the specific implementation of
the Trademark Clearinghouse within this application. We will adhere to all processes and
procedures to comply with ICANN guidance once this guidance is finalized.

Sunrise Service. Verisign implements a Sunrise service procedure for 30 days prior to the
launch of the general registration of domain names in the .verisign gTLD (unless we decide to
launch a longer Sunrise period). The .verisign Sunrise service will comply with the requirements
outlined in the current Applicant Guidebook as well as any final guidance to be issued pertaining
to the operation of the Trademark Clearinghouse.

Trademark Claims Service. Verisign also implements a Trademark Claims service for 60 days
after the launch of the general registration of domain names in the .verisign gTLD. The .verisign
Trademark Claims service will comply with the requirements outlined in the current Applicant
Guidebook as well as any final guidance to be issued pertaining to the operation of the
Trademark Clearinghouse.

2 MECHANISMS DESIGNED TO IDENTIFY AND ADDRESS THE ABUSIVE USE OF REGISTERED NAMES ON AN ONGOING BASIS

In addition to the Sunrise and Trademark Claims services described in Section 1 of this
response, Verisign implements and adheres to RPMs post-launch as mandated by ICANN, and
confirms that registrars accredited for the .verisign gTLD are in compliance with these
mechanisms. Certain aspects of these post-launch RPMs may be administered on behalf of
Verisign by Verisign-approved registrars.

These post-launch RPMs include the established Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution
Policy (UDRP), as well as the Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS) and Trademark Post-
Delegation Dispute Resolution Procedure (PDDRP). Where applicable, we will implement all
determinations and decisions issued under the corresponding RPM.

After a domain name is registered, trademark holders can object to the registration through the
UDRP or URS. Objections to the operation of the gTLD can be made through the PDDRP.

The following descriptions provide implementation details of each post-launch RPM for the
.verisign gTLD:

* UDRP: The UDRP provides a mechanism for complainants to object to domain name
registrations. The complainant files its objection with a UDRP provider and the domain name
registrant has an opportunity to respond. The UDRP provider makes a decision based on
the papers filed. If the complainant is successful, ownership of the domain name registration
is transferred to the complainant. If the complainant is not successful, ownership of the
domain name remains with the domain name registrant. Verisign and entities operating on
our behalf adhere to all decisions rendered by UDRP providers.

* URS: Verisign also provides for a Uniform Rapid Suspension (URS) system as specified in
the Applicant Guidebook. Similar to the UDRP, a complainant files its complaint with a URS
provider. The URS provider conducts an administrative review for compliance with the filing
requirements. If the complaint passes administrative review, the URS provider sends
Verisign, the registry operator for .verisign, a Notice of Complaint. Within 24 hours of receipt
of the Notice of Complaint, Verisign places the subject domain name on “lock,” which
restricts all changes to the registration data but allows the name to continue to resolve. After
the domain name is placed on lock, the URS provider notifies the registrant of the complaint.
The registrant is then given an opportunity to respond. The URS provider must then conduct
a review of the complaint and response based on the rules outlined in the Uniform Rapid
Suspension System Draft Procedures in the Applicant Guidebook. If the complainant is
successful, the registry operator is informed and the domain name is suspended for the
balance of the registration period; the domain name will not resolve to the original website,
but to an informational web page provided by the URS provider. If the complainant is not
successful, the lock is removed and full control of the domain name registration is returned
to the domain name registrant. Similar to the existing UDRP, Verisign and entities operating
on our behalf will adhere to the decisions rendered by the URS providers.

* PDDRP: Verisign also implements a PDDRP for the .verisign gTLD as provided in the
Applicant Guidebook. The PDDRP provides a mechanism for a complainant to object to the
registry operator’s manner of operation or use of the gTLD. The complainant files its
objection with a PDDRP provider, who performs a threshold review. The registry operator
has the opportunity to respond and the provider issues its determination based on the
papers filed, although there may be opportunity for further discovery and a hearing. Verisign
implements the PDDRP process as specified in the Applicant Guidebook.

Additional Measures Specific to Rights Protection

Verisign provides additional measures against potentially abusive registrations.
These measures help mitigate phishing, pharming, and other Internet security threats.
The measures exceed the minimum requirements for RPMsdefined by Specification 7 of the
Registry Agreement and are available at the time of registration. These measures include:

* Rapid Takedown or Suspension Based on Court Orders: We comply with orders from
courts of competent jurisdiction that direct Verisign to take any action on a domain name
that is within our technical capabilities as a TLD registry. Courts may issue such orders
when abusive content, such as child pornography, counterfeit goods, or illegal
pharmaceuticals, is found to be associated with a subject domain name.

* Anti-Abuse Process: We implement an anti-abuse process that is executed based on the
type of domain name takedown requested. The anti-abuse process is for malicious
exploitation of the DNS infrastructure, such as phishing, botnets, and malware.

* Authentication Procedures: We use two-factor authentication to augment security
protocols for telephone, email, and chat communications.

* Registry Lock: This Verisign service allows registrants to lock a domain name at the
registry level to protect against both unintended and malicious changes, deletions, and
transfers. Only Verisign can release the lock; thus all other entities that normally are
permitted to update Shared Registration System (SRS) records are prevented from doing
so. This lock is released only after the registrar makes the request to unlock.

* Malware Code Identification: This safeguard reduces opportunities for abusive behaviors
that use registered domain names in the gTLD. Registrants are often unknowing victims of
malware exploits. We have developed proprietary code to help identify malware in the zones
we manage, which in turn helps registrars by identifying malicious code hidden in their
domain names.

* DNSSEC Signing Service: Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) helps
mitigate pharming attacks that use cache poisoning to redirect unsuspecting users to
fraudulent websites or addresses. It uses public key cryptography to digitally sign DNS data
when it comes into the system and then validate it at its destination. The .verisign gTLD is
DNSSEC-enabled as part of our core registry services.

Implementation of Eligibility Restrictions

As noted in our response to Question 18, Verisign intends to impose registration eligibility
restrictions to prevent the sale, distribution, or transfer of control or use of any
registration in .verisign to any third party that is not an affiliate of Verisign.
These restrictions, which will require Verisign to approve all registrations before they are
allowed to go live, will be implemented through provisions in the Registry-Registrar Agreement.

3. RESOURCING PLANS

As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed a set of proprietary resourcing
models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. We
routinely adjust these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These
models enable us to continually right-size our staff to accommodate projected demand and
meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the
projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 –
Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to our staffing models, we derived the necessary
personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance. Cost
related to this infrastructure is provided as Line IIb.G, Total Critical Registry Function Cash
Outflows, within the Question 46 financial projections response.

We project we will use the following personnel roles, which are described in Section 5 of the
response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support the
implementation of RPMs:

* Customer Affairs Organization: 9
* Customer Support Personnel: 36
* Information Security Engineers: 11

1 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF PROCESSES AND SOLUTIONS DEPLOYED TO MANAGE LOGICAL
SECURITY ACROSS INFRASTRUCTURE AND SYSTEMS, MONITORING AND DETECTING THREATS AND SECURITY
VULNERABILITIES AND TAKING APPROPRIATE STEPS TO RESOLVE THEM

Verisign’s comprehensive security policy has evolved over the years as part of managing some
of the world’s most critical TLDs. Our Information Security Policy is the primary guideline that
sets the baseline for all other policies, procedures, and standards that we follow. This security
policy addresses all of the critical components for the management of backend registry services,
including architecture, engineering, and operations.

Our general security policies and standards with respect to these areas are provided as follows:

Architecture

* Information Security Architecture Standard: This standard establishes the Verisign
standard for application and network architecture. The document explains the methods
for segmenting application tiers, using authentication mechanisms, and implementing
application functions.

* Information Security Secure Linux Standard: This standard establishes the
information security requirements for all systems that run Linux throughout our
organization.

* Information Security Secure Oracle Standard: This standard establishes the
information security requirements for all systems that run Oracle throughout our
organization.

* Information Security Remote Access Standard: This standard establishes the
information security requirements for remote access to terminal services throughout our
organization.

* Information Security SSH Standard: This standard establishes the information security
requirements for the application of Secure Shell (SSH) on all systems throughout our
organization.

Engineering

* Secure SSL⁄TLS Configuration Standard: This standard establishes the information
security requirements for the configuration of Secure Sockets Layer⁄Transport Layer
Security (SSL⁄TLS) for all systems throughout our organization.

* Information Security C++ Standards: These standards explain how to use and
implement the functions and application programming interfaces (APIs) within C++. The
document also describes how to perform logging, authentication, and database
connectivity.

* Information Security Java Standards: These standards explain how to use and
implement the functions and APIs within Java. The document also describes how to
perform logging, authentication, and database connectivity.

Operations

* Information Security DNS Standard: This standard establishes the information
security requirements for all systems that run DNS systems throughout our organization.

* Information Security Cryptographic Key Management Standard: This standard
provides detailed information on both technology and processes for the use of
encryption on our information security systems.

* Secure Apache Standard: We have a multitude of Apache web servers, which are
used in both production and development environments on our intranet and on the
Internet. They provide a centralized, dynamic, and extensible interface to various other
systems that deliver information to the end user. Because of their exposure and the
confidential nature of the data that these systems host, adequate security measures
must be in place. The Secure Apache Standard establishes the information security
requirements for all systems that run Apache web servers throughout our organization.

* Secure Sendmail Standard: We use sendmail servers in both the production and
development environments on our intranet and on the Internet. Sendmail allows users to
communicate with one another via email. The Secure Sendmail Standard establishes
the information security requirements for all systems that run sendmail servers
throughout our organization.

* Secure Logging Standard: This standard establishes the information security logging
requirements for all systems and applications throughout our organization. Where
specific standards documents have been created for operating systems or applications,
the logging standards have been detailed. This document covers all technologies.

* Patch Management Standard: This standard establishes the information security patch
and upgrade management requirements for all systems and applications throughout our
organization.

General

* Secure Password Standard: Because passwords are the most popular and, in many
cases, the sole mechanism for authenticating a user to a system, great care must be
taken to help ensure that passwords are “strong” and secure. The Secure Password
Standard details requirements for the use and implementation of passwords.

* Secure Anti-Virus Standard: We must be protected continuously from computer
viruses and other forms of malicious code. These threats can cause significant damage
to the overall operation and security of our network. The Secure Anti-Virus Standard
describes the requirements for minimizing the occurrence and impact of these incidents.

Security processes and solutions for the .verisign TLD are based on the standards defined
above, each of which is derived from our experience and industry best practice. These
standards comprise the framework for the overall security solution and applicable processes
implemented across all products under our management. The security solution and applicable
processes include, but are not limited to:

* System and network access control (e.g., monitoring, logging, and backup)

* Independent assessment and periodic independent assessment reports

* Denial of service (DoS) and distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack mitigation

* Computer and network incident response policies, plans, and processes

* Minimization of risk of unauthorized access to systems or tampering with registry data

* Intrusion detection mechanisms, threat analysis, defenses, and updates

* Auditing of network access

* Physical security

Further details of these processes and solutions are provided in Part B of this response.

1.1 Security Policy and Procedures for the Proposed Registry

Specific security policy related details, requested as the bulleted items of Question 30 – Part A,
are provided here.

Independent Assessment and Periodic Independent Assessment Reports

To help ensure effective security controls are in place, we conduct a yearly American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA)
SAS 70 audit on all of our data centers, hosted systems, and applications. During these SAS 70
audits, security controls at the operational, technical, and human level are rigorously tested.
These audits are conducted by a certified and accredited third party and help ensure that our in-
place environments meet the security criteria specified in our customer contractual agreements
and are in accordance with commercially accepted security controls and practices. We also
perform numerous audits throughout the year to verify our security processes and activities.
These audits cover many different environments and technologies and validate our capability to
protect our registry and DNS resolution environments. Figure 30A-1 (see Attachment
VRSN_.verisign_Q30A_Figures for all figures in this response) lists a subset of the audits that
we conduct. For each audit program or certification listed in Figure 30A-1, we have included, as
attachments to the Part B component of this response, copies of the assessment reports
conducted by the listed third-party auditor. (See VRSN_.verisign_Q30B-1_Attachment_SAS70;
VRSN_.verisign_Q30B-2_Attachment_KPMGSysTrust; VRSN_.verisign_Q30B-
3_Attachment_KPMG 10K; and VRSN_.verisign_Q30B-4_Attachment_InfoSecPolicy.) From our
experience operating registries, we have determined that together these audit programs and
certifications provide a reliable means to ensure effective security controls are in place and that
these controls are sufficient to meet ICANN security requirements and therefore are
commensurate with the guidelines defined by ISO 27001.

Augmented Security Levels or Capabilities

See Section 5 of this response.

Commitments Made to Registrants Concerning Security Levels

See Section 4 of this response.

2 SECURITY CAPABILITIES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE OVERALL BUSINESS APPROACH
AND PLANNED SIZE OF THE REGISTRY

3 TECHNICAL PLAN ADEQUATELY RESOURCED IN THE PLANNED COSTS DETAILED IN THE FINANCIAL SECTION

As an experienced backend registry provider, we have developed a set of proprietary resourcing
models to project the number and type of personnel resources necessary to operate a TLD. We
routinely adjust these staffing models to account for new tools and process innovations. These
models enable us to continually right-size our staff to accommodate projected demand and
meet service level agreements as well as Internet security and stability requirements. Using the
projected usage volume for the most likely scenario (defined in Question 46, Template 1 –
Financial Projections: Most Likely) as an input to our staffing models, we derived the necessary
personnel levels required for this gTLD’s initial implementation and ongoing maintenance.
Cost related to this infrastructure is provided as “Total Critical Registry Function Cash Outflows”
(Template 1, Line IIb.G) within the Question 46 financial projections response.

We project we will use the following personnel role, which is described in Section 5 of the
response to Question 31, Technical Overview of Proposed Registry, to support our security
policy:

* Information Security Engineers: 11

4 SECURITY MEASURES ARE CONSISTENT WITH ANY COMMITMENTS MADE TO REGISTRANTS
REGARDING SECURITY LEVELS

For the .verisign gTLD, no unique security measures or commitments must be made by Verisign
to any registrant.

5 SECURITY MEASURES ARE APPROPRIATE FOR THE APPLIED-FOR gTLD STRING (FOR EXAMPLE,
APPLICATIONS FOR STRINGS WITH UNIQUE TRUST IMPLICATIONS, SUCH AS FINANCIAL SERVICES-ORIENTED
STRINGS, WOULD BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE A COMMENSURATE LEVEL
OF SECURITY)

No unique security measures are necessary to implement the .verisign gTLD. As defined in
Section 1 of this response, Verisign commits to providing registry services in accordance with
the following international and relevant security standards:

* American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA) and Canadian Institute of
Chartered Accountants (CICA) SAS 70

* WebTrust⁄SysTrust for Certification Authorities (CA)

Demetrios James Bidzos	Executive Chairman, Director and Chairman of the Board, President, Chief Executive Officer
John Dewitt Cox Roach	Director
Kathleen Ann Cote	Director, Chairman, Corporate Governance & Nominating Committee
Louis Allen Simpson	Director, Chairman, Compensation Committee
Roger Herman Moore	Director
Timothy Tomlinson	Director
William Lawrence Chenevich	Director, Chairman, Audit Committee

Demetrios James Bidzos	Executive Chairman, Director and Chairman of the Board, President, Chief Executive Officer
George Edward Kilguss III	Senior VP and CFO
Patrick Steven Kane	Senior Vice President and General Manager, Naming Services
Richard Henley Goshorn	Senior Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary

New gTLD Application Submitted to ICANN by: VeriSign, Inc.

String: verisign

Originally Posted: 13 June 2012

Application ID: 1-1145-77950

Applicant Information

1. Full legal name

2. Address of the principal place of business

3. Phone number

4. Fax number

5. If applicable, website or URL

Primary Contact

6(a). Name

6(b). Title

6(c). Address

6(d). Phone Number

6(e). Fax Number

6(f). Email Address

Secondary Contact

7(a). Name

7(b). Title

7(c). Address

7(d). Phone Number

7(e). Fax Number

7(f). Email Address

Proof of Legal Establishment

8(a). Legal form of the Applicant

8(b). State the specific national or other jursidiction that defines the type of entity identified in 8(a).

8(c). Attach evidence of the applicant's establishment.

9(a). If applying company is publicly traded, provide the exchange and symbol.

9(b). If the applying entity is a subsidiary, provide the parent company.

9(c). If the applying entity is a joint venture, list all joint venture partners.

Applicant Background

11(a). Name(s) and position(s) of all directors

11(b). Name(s) and position(s) of all officers and partners

11(c). Name(s) and position(s) of all shareholders holding at least 15% of shares

11(d). For an applying entity that does not have directors, officers, partners, or shareholders: Name(s) and position(s) of all individuals having legal or executive responsibility

Applied-for gTLD string

13. Provide the applied-for gTLD string. If an IDN, provide the U-label.

14(a). If an IDN, provide the A-label (beginning with "xn--").

14(b). If an IDN, provide the meaning or restatement of the string in English, that is, a description of the literal meaning of the string in the opinion of the applicant.

14(c). If an IDN, provide the language of the label (in English).

14(c). If an IDN, provide the language of the label (as referenced by ISO-639-1).

14(d). If an IDN, provide the script of the label (in English).

14(d). If an IDN, provide the script of the label (as referenced by ISO 15924).

14(e). If an IDN, list all code points contained in the U-label according to Unicode form.

15(a). If an IDN, Attach IDN Tables for the proposed registry.

15(b). Describe the process used for development of the IDN tables submitted, including consultations and sources used.

15(c). List any variant strings to the applied-for gTLD string according to the relevant IDN tables.

16. Describe the applicant's efforts to ensure that there are no known operational or rendering problems concerning the applied-for gTLD string. If such issues are known, describe steps that will be taken to mitigate these issues in software and other applications.

17. (OPTIONAL) Provide a representation of the label according to the International Phonetic Alphabet (http://www.langsci.ucl.ac.uk/ipa/).

Mission/Purpose

18(a). Describe the mission/purpose of your proposed gTLD.

18(b). How do you expect that your proposed gTLD will benefit registrants, Internet users, and others?

18(c). What operating rules will you adopt to eliminate or minimize social costs?

Community-based Designation

19. Is the application for a community-based TLD?

20(a). Provide the name and full description of the community that the applicant is committing to serve.

20(b). Explain the applicant's relationship to the community identified in 20(a).

20(c). Provide a description of the community-based purpose of the applied-for gTLD.

20(d). Explain the relationship between the applied-for gTLD string and the community identified in 20(a).

20(e). Provide a description of the applicant's intended registration policies in support of the community-based purpose of the applied-for gTLD.

20(f). Attach any written endorsements from institutions/groups representative of the community identified in 20(a).

Geographic Names

21(a). Is the application for a geographic name?

Protection of Geographic Names

22. Describe proposed measures for protection of geographic names at the second and other levels in the applied-for gTLD.

Registry Services

23. Provide name and full description of all the Registry Services to be provided.

Demonstration of Technical & Operational Capability

24. Shared Registration System (SRS) Performance

25. Extensible Provisioning Protocol (EPP)

26. Whois

27. Registration Life Cycle

28. Abuse Prevention and Mitigation

29. Rights Protection Mechanisms

30(a). Security Policy: Summary of the security policy for the proposed registry

© Internet Corporation For Assigned Names and Numbers.