## Registry System Threat Analysis

(Last updated:	2012-03-23 by	Gavin	Brown)
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System/Asset	Threat	Source	Severity	Frequency	Score	Mitigation
Authoritative DNS System	Denial of service	Hacktivists, vandals, blackmailers, hostile governments, criminals	3	2	6	Over-provision query handling capacity so that attack traffic doesn't block legitimate traffic Deploy Anycast to provide geographic traffic load balancing and isolation Filtering at network edge to prevent attack traffic from reaching core infrastructure Surveillance to detect and prevent potential attacks
Zone File Data	Unauthorized access	Spammers, identity thieves, criminals	1	3	3	Use VPN to secure zone data transfers to prevent tampering Enforce access restrictions on archived zone files to prevent leakage Use NSEC3 on signed zones to prevent enumeration Secure FTP interface for authorised access as normal FTP is insecure and can be intercepted Intrusion detection on servers and network devices to provide early warning and rapid response
	Unauthorized alteration	Hacktivists, vandals, governments, criminals	3	1	3	Use TSIG to sign zone transfers to prevent tampering Perform checks on zone data for consistency among servers to detect tampering Intrusion detection on servers and network devices to provide early warning and rapid response
Unauthorized access DNSSEC Key Data Denial of service		Hacktivists, vandals, blackmailers, hostile governments, criminals	3	1	3	Store keys in HSMs or TPMs to prevent unauthorised access even if attacker has physical access Offline signing rather than online signing using isolated hardware so keys aren't held in "shallow" locations Physical isolation of signing equipment to prevent remote intrusion
	Denial of service	Hacktivists, vandals, blackmailers	3	1	3	Back up key data, store securely at multiple sites to provide multiple backups to restore from Standby signer available if primary system fails or is compromised to ensure continuity
Registry Database	Unauthorized access	Spammers, fraudsters, identity thieves, criminals, hostile governments	2	1	2	Protect Whois server from dictionary attacks by rate limiting and blocking query sources Restrict SRS access SRS access to trusted hosts/networks Secure core registry database Ensure all backups are encrypted before leaving database system

Threat	Source	Severity	Frequency	Score	Mitigation
					Restrict and monitor all access to registrar and administrator
					consoles
					Intrusion detection on servers and network devices to provide
					early warning and rapid response
Unauthorized alteration	Identity thieves, vandals, domain hijackers	2	1		Restrict SRS access to trusted hosts/networks
					Enforce mutual client/server authentication in EPP using SSL certificates
					Secure core registry database
				2	Ensure all backups are encrypted before leaving database system
					Restrict and monitor all access to registrar and administrator
					consoles
					Intrusion detection on servers and network devices to provide
					early warning and rapid response
	Identity thieves, vandals, domain hijackers Hacktivists, vandals	2	1	2	Restrict SRS access to trusted hosts/networks
Unauthorized					Enforce mutual client/server authentication in EPP using SSL
					certificates
					Intrusion detection on servers and network devices to provide
					early warning and rapid response
				2	Restrict SRS access to trusted hosts/networks
Denial of service					Intrusion detection on servers and network devices to provide
					early warning and rapid response
		s 3	1	3	Global firewall system to cover primary operations centre, all remote sites secured with local firewalls
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	Hacktivists, vandals				Access policy for remote administration Restrict and monitor access to administrator accounts on servers
access					and network equipment
Registry					Ensure security-related software updates are applied promptly
	of service Hacktivists, vandals	3	1	3	Physically separate non-related components to avoid shared fate
					Filtering at network edge to prevent attack traffic from reaching
					core infrastructure
					Redundant network connectivity to provide agility and additional
Denial of service					upstream transit
					Surveillance to detect and prevent potential attacks
					Intrusion detection on servers and network devices to provide
					early warning and rapid response
	Unauthorized alteration Unauthorized access Denial of service Unauthorized access	Unauthorized alterationIdentity thieves, vandals, domain hijackersUnauthorized accessIdentity thieves, vandals, domain hijackersDenial of serviceHacktivists, vandalsUnauthorized accessHacktivists, vandals	Unauthorized alterationIdentity thieves, vandals, domain hijackers2Unauthorized accessIdentity thieves, vandals, domain hijackers2Denial of serviceHacktivists, vandals2Unauthorized accessHacktivists, vandals3	Unauthorized alterationIdentity thieves, vandals, domain hijackers21Unauthorized accessIdentity thieves, vandals, 	Unauthorized alterationIdentity thieves, vandals, domain hijackers212Unauthorized accessIdentity thieves, vandals, domain hijackers212Unauthorized accessIdentity thieves, vandals, domain hijackers212Denial of serviceHacktivists, vandals212Unauthorized accessHacktivists, vandals313